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1 Executive Summary 
Online social applications and the integration of sensing devices with mobile communication 
devices, leverage the heterogeneity of users in terms of interests, preferences, mobility, and enable the 
generation of various types of virtual (internet-mediated) communities that collectively enrich people’s 
awareness about their environment and promote new forms of participatory processes and approaches 
to managing its features. Typically, the platforms that host these communities engage autonomous 
users and deliver a utility that depends on the participants' number and behaviors. In this respect, the 
challenge for platform designers is to engage people into mechanisms of active contribution and 
collaboration.  
 In this deliverable, we investigate different dimensions inherent in these platforms bringing in 
front the composite socio-psychological incentives that motivate participation, privacy issues and the 
market viewpoint that may apply to them. We first review formal definitions of virtual communities 
and related research that introduces criteria for classification of various virtual community paradigms. 
Relative inputs from theories on the broader context of collective action, public goods' management 
and social dilemmas have also been accommodated. We then identify and discuss incentives and social 
mechanisms that are activated in different types of virtual communities, drawing insights and results 
from social psychology literature and studies on online communities. Finally, we examine existing 
communities with specific focus on the exposed mechanisms that can affect positively or negatively 
people's behavior and, ultimately, impact on the community’s delivered utility. 
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2 Introduction  
The explosive growth of the Internet since the mid-1990s has fostered the increase of virtual 
communities in the form of social networking services and online communities. Especially in the last 
decade, a lot of online systems support massive collaboration in order to produce public repositories of 
information. These systems cover various areas of interest, such as social networking sites, wikis, 
open-source software, Q&A sites, internet peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing networks, Collective 
Awareness Platforms (CAPs) and many more. The success of these systems relies on the degree of 
people’s contribution and collaboration, so the challenge for system designers is to motivate people to 
actively participate. Typically, when individuals contribute information or work for a collective benefit, 
there is a social dilemma involved. Namely, people have to make a decision: spend effort and time that 
will benefit others or act selfishly and defer from contributing? 
Because of the diversity of online systems, their purpose and use, it is not trivial to identify an 
one-fits-all answer as to what motivates people to contribute to them. There are different social 
psychological incentives that influence individuals’ behavior, address their concerns and are related to 
specific types of contribution. All these aspects and perspectives will be elaborated in this deliverable.  
In particular, in Chapter 3 we describe CAPs in the broader context of virtual communities, their 
various definitions, types and classification rules, and discuss critical concepts applied to them. 
Further activity in such virtual communities has been studied in the broader context of collective 
action, public goods and social dilemmas in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 describes incentives and social 
mechanisms that underlie people’s behavior when deciding on their contribution/participation in a 
collective action system. In Chapter 5, we present different real instances of online cooperation based 
on recent research and explain how the aforementioned incentives influence contribution in various 
platforms of virtual communities. This deliverable expands on D1 (“Characterization and typologies of 
CAPs”) and wraps up the work on the information/privacy, market, and socio-psychological 
dimensions of CAPs (T1.2-T1.4). 
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3 Background and motivation 
3.1 Virtual communities 
The definition of term “community” can vary widely in different disciplines and among different 
individuals [[25]]. A community has both symbolic and functional definitions. People are grouped with 
respect to physical presence and space, and form urban, rural or suburban communities, but they can 
also be grouped into symbolic subdivisions based on lifestyle, identity or character and form leisurely, 
religious or philosophical communities. Raymond Williams in [[56]] in an attempt to discover the 
essence of community, observed that a community is not just a bounded locale, but also “the quality of 
holding something in common, as in community of interests, community of goods,… a sense of 
common identity and characteristics.” The meaning of community evolved so that it encompasses 
quality and social relationships apart from spatial relations.  
The meaning of “virtuality” on the other hand has shifted over the years. “Virtual” and “actual” 
have not always been opposite and mutually exclusive meanings as we think of them now. As explained 
by Ryan in [[45]]: “In scholastic philosophy “actual” and “virtual” exist in a dialectical relation rather 
than in one of radical opposition: the virtual is not that which is deprived of existence but that which 
possesses the potential, or force, of developing into actual existence.” However in later uses of the 
notion, especially since the beginning of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this dialectical 
meaning of actual has been shifting into a binary opposition to real. This means that the virtual 
becomes the fictive and the non-existent, i.e., as opposed against ‘reality’, illustrated by ideas like 
‘virtual reality’. Especially in the popular imagination at the end of the twentieth century, the word 
‘virtual’ triggers thoughts of computers and digital technologies.  
The term “virtual community” was coined by Rheingold in 1985, when he created the WELL, a 
"computer conferencing" system, which was one of the first online newsgroups. In his book “The 
Virtual Community” (1993) he defined the term as “social aggregations that emerge from the Net when 
enough people carry on those public discussions long enough, with sufficient human feeling, to form 
webs of personal relationships in cyberspace” [[42]]. In recent literature however, a virtual community 
has been extended in the following ways: it can include business partners instead of just individuals 
and it can be partially supported rather than fully supported by technology, thus resulting in the 
definition:  
A Virtual Community can be defined as  
 an aggregation of individuals or business partners  
 who interact around a shared interest,  
 where the interaction is at least partially supported and/or mediated by technology and 
 guided by some protocols or norms [40].  
The term virtual community however seems to include more concepts describing online systems 
that have emerged during the past decade. For example there seems to be an ambiguity of “virtual 
communities” and “online social networks” and also between the terms “online collaborative systems” 
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and “collective awareness platforms”.  We will try to give a more detailed description for each of these 
concepts, which will reveal the similarities and differences between them and position virtual 
communities in respect to online social networks, online collaborative systems and collective 
awareness platforms. 
Online Social Networks (OSNs): OSNs are online communities among people with 
common interests, activities, backgrounds and/or friendships. Unlike the Web, which is largely 
organized around content, OSNs are organized around users. Participating users join a network, 
publish their profile and any content, and create links to any other users with whom they associate. 
The resulting social network provides a basis for maintaining social relationships, for finding users 
with similar interests, and for locating content and knowledge that has been contributed or endorsed 
by other users [[47]],[[35]]. OSNs are formed through Social Networking Sites (SNSs). An SNS can be 
defined as a web-based service that allows individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile 
within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and 
(3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the system. An 
interesting feature of SNS is not that they allow individuals to meet strangers, but rather that they 
enable users to articulate and make visible their social networks [[13]]. Among the most popular social 
networking sites are Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Pinterest, MySpace. 
Online collaborative systems: These can be defined as systems that enable geographically 
dispersed teams or individuals, which are action oriented, to work together. Despite of the differing 
locations, each member’s work or contribution is highly reliant on others’.   
Online collaboration is accomplished by providing tools for collaboration, including team areas 
with member profiles, online discussion areas, document and file-sharing areas, integrated 
calendaring and collaborative authoring tools. Online collaborative systems are met for learning or 
working purposes. Weblogs and Wikis can be used for online collaboration, but there are also 
numerous collaborative platforms [[18]]. 
Collective Awareness Platforms (CAPs): The Collective Awareness Platforms for 
Sustainability and Social Innovation are ICT systems leveraging the "network effect" or the “Collective 
Intelligence” for gathering and making use of open data by combining social media, distributed 
knowledge creation and data from real environments (Internet of Things - IoT1). They are expected to 
support environmentally aware, grassroots processes and practices to share knowledge, to achieve 
changes in lifestyle, production and consumption patterns and to set up more participatory democratic 
                                                             
1  Internet of Things (IoT): Electronic tags embedded in every item we buy or wear or live in, 
supporting commerce, maintenance, and operation of countless systems, and offering the means to create a 
greater pervasive awareness of our surrounding world. IoT brings the promise of providing humans with 
enhanced sensory capabilities, as well as serious risks to our privacy, depending on the implementation approach 
that is chosen. 
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processes. The ultimate goal is to foster a more sustainable future based on a low-carbon, beyond GDP 
economy, and a resilient, cooperative democratic community. Several efforts have been made by 
governments and public organizations to cope with environmental problems, however the idea behind 
CAPs is that much more can be done if citizens are more actively involved, in a grassroots manner 
[[14]], [[48]]. 
CAPs apply to different areas, such as systems that create awareness about sustainability 
impacts on consumers' choice (energy, environment or health), systems for making more efficient and 
worldwide-scale collaborative consumption (lending, exchange, bartering), systems that gather 
facts/evidence from citizens for better decision making (at personal or institutional levels), systems 
that intend to improve public services, urban environments, democracy, Internet, based on open data.  
Some examples of the fore mentioned CAPs categories are: 
The Eatery: The Eatery provides customized nutritional advice based on actual eating and 
sharing/comparing eating habits over social networks. Through an iPhone application, the user snaps 
a photo of his meal, posts it and gets information about his nutrition habits and ways to change habits 
if necessary. 
AIRBNB: renting rooms or places from other people. AIRBNB is a trusted community 
marketplace for people to list, discover, and book unique accommodations around the world. It gives 
people the opportunity to monetize their extra space and showcase it to an audience of millions. 
Zilok: Rental of objects between professionals or individuals 
Eyeonearth: Eye on Earth is a global public information network for creating and sharing 
environmentally relevant data and information online through interactive map-based visualisations. 
The overall goal is to improve the environment by sharing information and knowledge. 
Safer-streets: Safer Streets allows people to upload pictures or report about accidents. 
Safecast: Safecast is a global sensor network for collecting and sharing radiation measurements 
to empower people with data about their environments. 
TheyWorkForYou: a website that monitors the activity of UK politicians.  
Collective Intelligence (CI): A definition of the term is given by Malone in [[33]], director of 
MIT Center for Collective Intelligence (CCI). “Collective Intelligence is groups of individuals doing 
things collectively that seem intelligent”. The objective of CCI is to find answers to the question:  “How 
can people and computers be connected so that collectively they act more intelligently than any 
individual, group, or computer has ever done before?” Examples of CI systems are Wikipedia, Linux, 
Google, Ebay, YouTube. Users in these systems work together in effective ways, sometimes even 
without knowing that they are working together.  
Having in mind the definition of a virtual community and the attributes of Online Social 
Networks (OSNs), Online Collaborative Systems and Collective Awareness Platforms (CAPs), we 
conclude that they are all virtual communities. A virtual community has four necessary elements (1) a 
group of people, (2) a shared interest, (3) interaction supported by technology and (4) use of 
protocols/norms. Overall, 
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Online Social Networks (OSNs) 
1. are formed by a group of people 
2. whose shared interest is the creation and maintaining of social relationships 
3. where interaction is accomplished through Social Network Sites (SNSs) 
4.  with protocols defined by the SNS: Create profile, construct list of “friends” and make use of 
SNS tools for communication. 
Online Collaborative Systems 
1. are formed by geographically dispersed people   
2. whose shared interest is learning or carrying out work  
3. where interaction is accomplished through various collaborative platforms (Wikis, Blogs or 
custom platforms for the specific task) 
4. and protocols used are decision making and voting 
Collective Awareness Platforms (CAPs) 
1.  The users of the platform 
2.  share a common interest like health, environment, society and democracy concern 
3.  use websites or mobile applications 
4.  with protocols/norms defined by the specific platform used. 
 
Apparently, there is an ambiguity regarding the terms “online social networks” and “online 
collaborative systems” as well as the terms “collective awareness platforms” and “virtual communities” 
since all these terms are closely related yet not identical. In the sequel, we use the term “virtual 
communities” as an alias for all these related terms.  
3.2 Typology of virtual communities 
There have been various attempts to systematically categorize and characterize virtual 
communities. Some of the most recent ones are presented by Markus [[34]], Porter [[40]] and Malone 
[[33]]. Although these approaches do not deal with the same virtual communities - for example 
Malone deals only with Collective Intelligence systems - these approaches expose critical similarities. 
Markus presents a classification based on the community’s social, professional or commercial 
orientation. At the next level these types can be further broken down based on various attributes of the 
virtual community, such as member behavior, the community’s purpose, or the motives that prompt 
its members to participate in as shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Markus’s typology of virtual communities 
 
A couple of years later Porter proposes a different classification of virtual communities. Porter 
suggests a two-level classification, based on establishment (1st level) and relationship orientation (2nd 
level) as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Porter’s typology of virtual communities 
 
At the first level we have Member-initiated and Organization-sponsored communities. Member-
initiated communities are those where the community was established by, and remains managed by, 
members. Organization-sponsored communities are communities that are sponsored by either 
commercial or non-commercial organizations. The second partitioning variable is relationship 
orientation, because of its importance in virtual communities. This results in having social, 
professional, commercial, non-profit and government communities in the second level. 
Although Markus and Porter use different classification variables, the resulting types of virtual 
communities show that they have some “blocks” in common. For example both classifications 
distinguish social, professional and commercial virtual communities. On the other hand, contrary to 
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Markus methodology, Porter does not use the characteristics of virtual communities in order to classify 
them. Porter uses this two-level classification and enriched it with an attribute-based description. The 
reason for not using attributes as categorization variables is that attributes are narrowly focused 
around disciplinary areas of interest.  
The attributes of virtual communities proposed by Porter are (1) Purpose, (2) Place, (3) 
Platform, (4) Population Interaction Structure and (5) Profit Model. These are the so-called “Five Ps 
of Virtual Communities” and when carefully selected in unique combinations when creating a virtual 
community, are likely to result in successful outcomes for both members and organizational sponsors.  
1.  The notion of Purpose is central in a virtual community, since the community is defined by a 
shared purpose or interest, which forms the basis of interaction.  
2.  Place is important but difficult to define because of the “aspatial” nature of such communities. 
In the context of Porter’s typology it embraces the notion of “degree of virtualness”, meaning 
that communities can be categorized based on the extent to which community members share 
virtual space and/or physical space on an ongoing or intermittent basis.  
3.  Platform has to do with the technical design of interaction. The primary factor that 
distinguishes the capabilities of virtual communities is synchronicity, the degree to which a 
medium enables real-time interaction. Thus Platform can be conceptualized as having three 
levels (synchronous, asynchronous and hybrid).  
4.  Population Interaction Structure refers to the pattern of interaction among community 
members as described by group structure. It can be conceptualized as having three primary 
levels: small group (where strong ties tend to dominate), network (where weak ties are 
prominent and stressful ties are likely) and publics (where interaction is variable and likely to 
include strong, weak and/or stressful ties). 
5.  Profit model refers to whether a community creates tangible economic value, where value is 
defined as revenue-generation.  
It is important to keep in mind that the classifications proposed by Markus and Porter describe 
virtual communities of the previous decade. This results in having some differences from the 
characteristics of nowadays communities. For example, these two approaches stress the existence of 
commercial virtual communities, that were developed in order for companies to gain more customers, 
yet this type of community is not so popular any more. Moreover the Profit model described by Porter 
refers to tangible awards, thus leaving out the importance of non-monetary awards that motivate 
people, such as social approval, reputation, enjoyment, feeling of contributing to a cause larger than 
themselves, etc.. 
In a more recent study focused on collective intelligence (CI) systems, Malone proposed a user’s 
guide to the building blocks of collective intelligence. The idea was to describe the fundamental 
attributes of collective intelligence systems, thus providing a useful guide for designing a powerful 
system. After studying 250 examples of web-enabled CI, Malone raised four questions that could 
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describe a CI system. These questions are (1) What is being done?, (2) Who is doing it?, (3) Why are 
they doing it? and 4) How is it being done. The answers to these questions are the proposed four 
fundamental attributes for all CI applications. Malone analyzed the possible values for these attributes 
and by employing an analogy from biology, he described the “genes” of CI systems. A gene is defined as 
a particular answer to one of the key questions (What, Who, Why or How). 
1. What? This is the first question to be answered for any activity. It is the mission or goal or 
simply the task. The task can be to (a) Create something new or (b) Decide among different 
alternatives. 
2. Who? The question is about who undertakes an activity. Possible answers are (a) Hierarchy, 
where someone in authority assigns a particular person or group to perform a task and (b) 
Crowd, where the activity can be undertaken by anyone in a large group who chooses to do so. 
3. Why? This question deals with incentives, the reason for which people take part in the activity. 
What motivates them? What incentives are at work? The possible answers are (a) Money, 
where participants earn money from the activity, (b) Love, in the sense of intrinsic enjoyment 
of the activity, the opportunity to socialize, the idea of contributing to something larger than 
themselves, and (c) Glory, which is the recognition of themselves among their community. 
4. How? The final question is about the structures and processes used. In traditional systems 
hierarchy is the basic structure used, but novel systems use crowds widely. The proposed 
“genes” by Malone are focused on answering the How question for crowds. The possible values 
for the How genes are (a) Collection, where contributions are made independently of others, 
(b) Collaboration, where members from the crowd work together and there are strong 
dependencies between their contributions, (c) Group Decision like voting, consensus or 
averaging and (d) Individual Decisions where members decide by themselves. 
By comparing the building blocks of a CI system proposed by Malone and the attributes of a 
virtual community presented by Porter, we identify similarities in the proposed 
attributes/features/modules, as Table 1 suggests. This leads us to the conclusion that these attributes, 
although described by slightly different names, are indeed fundamental attributes of a virtual 
community, based on which they can be characterized and classified. 
Table 1: Comparison of attributes of virtual communities 
Malone’s CI genes Porter’s VC attributes 
What? Purpose 
Who? Population 
Why? Profit Model 
How? Platform 
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3.3 The Free-Rider Problem 
In general, participants in collective action can opt for being active contributors or free-riders. 
In economics, collective bargaining, psychology, and political science "free-riders" are those who 
consume more than their fair share of a public resource, or shoulder less than a fair share of the costs 
of its production. Free-riding is usually considered to be an economic problem, only when it leads to 
the non-production or under-production of a public good, or when it leads to the excessive use of a 
common property resource. The free-rider problem is the question of how to limit free-riding or its 
negative effects in these situations.  
The classic example and origin of the term is a free-rider on public transportation. Someone 
who hops on a bus without paying the fare, benefits from the bus paid for by other riders, as well as tax 
levies that raise money for transportation. If enough people evade the fares, the bus becomes 
unsustainable to run. Another example of the free-rider problem is defense spending: nobody can be 
excluded from being defended by a state's military forces, and thus free-riders may refuse or avoid 
paying for being defended, even though they are still as well guarded as those who contribute to the 
state's efforts. Therefore governments avoid relying on volunteer donations and use taxes instead. 
In the context of virtual communities, free-riders can put the viability of the community at risk. 
According to Beenen et al. in [[28]], many online communities fail due to low contributions. Even the 
ones that survive have low contributions. In Gnutella two thirds of the users free-ride and 10% of the 
users provide 87% of all the music. In open source development communities 4% of developers 
contribute 88% of new code and 66% of code fixes. Although not everyone needs to contribute in order 
for the community to be successful, when there is a large proportion of free-riders, it is difficult to 
provide nominal services to the members. 
3.4 Game Theory 
Contribution in virtual communities can be examined in the broader context of public goods and 
social dilemmas. When individuals contribute information or work for a collective benefit, there is a 
social dilemma involved. That is, they have to make a decision either to spend effort and time that will 
benefit others or act selfishly and don’t contribute at all.  
Social dilemmas are situations in which self-interest is at odds with collective interests. A social 
dilemma has been described as a conflict in which most beneficial action for an individual will, if 
chosen by most people, have a harmful effect on everyone. This behavior, people being selfish or 
cooperative, is met in various fields of research like economy, biology, psychology, sociology and 
political science and in order for researchers to study social dilemmas, game theory is used. 
Game Theory is the logical analysis of situations of conflict and cooperation. Game Theory is so 
named because it abstracts from and generalizes the study of traditional games, e.g., chess, bridge and 
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poker, but this abstraction and generalization is powerful enough to include a wide variety of 
important social situations. For example, companies pursuing corporate strategies or political 
candidates trying to win the elections are both playing a game. 
In Game Theory a game is built, which models some important features of the real situation. A 
game is defined by as a situation in which: 
1. There are at least two players 
2. Each player has a number of possible strategies 
3. The strategies chosen by each player determine the outcome of the game 
4. Each possible outcome is a collection of numerical payoffs 
So, Game Theory investigates how players should rationally play games. Each player selects one 
of his possible strategies (one of which can amount to free-riding) and anticipates the game to end with 
an outcome that gives him as large payoff as possible. But the outcome is not determined by his choice 
alone, but also upon the choices of other players, and this is where conflict and cooperation arise.   
3.4.1 Prisoner's Dilemma 
The most widely studied and used game in social science is the Prisoner’s Dilemma. It is the 
simplest possible case of a social dilemma, which involves two people faced with the decision of 
whether to cooperate or behave selfishly (defect). Both can gain by cooperating, but there is a 
temptation to be selfish, since the payoff is bigger for the one who defects. If both people behave 
selfishly, however, they are both worse off than they might have been otherwise. In Prisoner’s 
Dilemma there is a conflict between individual rationality and group rationality. When individuals 
rationally pursue their own best interest, this results to an outcome which is unfortunate for both of 
them.  
The importance of Prisoner’s Dilemma is that many social phenomena seem to have Prisoner’s 
Dilemma at their core. Because this kind of conflict between individual rationality and group 
rationality is so widespread, there have been a number of attempts to resolve the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
usually by finding some argument which can justify playing the cooperative strategy. One way to do 
this is to play iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Axelrod in [6] invited professional game theorists to write 
computer programs to play iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. The one that won, called Tit-For-Tat, was the 
simplest one, and its strategy was simple reciprocity which cooperates on the first move and then does 
whatever the other player did on the previous move. Axelrod noticed that the most successful 
strategies of the tournament shared some common properties: avoidance of unnecessary conflict by 
cooperating as long as the other player does, provocability in the face of an uncalled-for defection by 
the other, forgiveness after responding to a provocation, and clarity of behavior so that the other 
player can recognize and adapt to your pattern of action.  
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These kinds of strategies that reinforce cooperation prove that cooperation based on reciprocity 
can prove helpful where there is a conflict between individual rationality and group rationality. 
3.4.2 Public Goods Game 
In economics, a public good is a good that is both non-excludable and non-rivalrous in that 
individuals cannot be effectively excluded from use and where use by one individual does not reduce 
availability to others. Public goods are closely related to the “free-rider” problem, since someone can 
benefit from resources, goods, or services without paying for the cost of the benefit. Public goods are 
also related to the “Tragedy of the commons”, where consumption of a shared resource by individuals 
who act independently and rationally according to each one's self-interest – and not according to the 
group’s interest - may result to the depletion of a common source. 
The social dilemma of public goods situation is that although a group of cooperators is always 
better off than a group of defectors, defectors exploit cooperators in groups. Since the late 1970s, 
economists, social scientists and evolutionary biologists have used the public goods game as a model to 
study the problem of maintaining cooperation in a group of unrelated individuals. The Public Goods 
Game is a standard of experimental economics, where a typical public goods experiment involves a 
group of people who must decide whether to contribute to a group project or account.  
The basic (“one-shot”) Public Goods Game consists of a group of individuals who are asked to 
secretly choose how many of their private tokens to contribute to a public pool. The items in the pool 
are then multiplied by a factor (greater than one and less than the number of players - N) and they are 
divided and equally distributed to all the players of the group, either they contributed or not. Any 
remaining tokens are allocated to a private account. At the end of the round participants see either the 
individual contributions made by members of the group or the total (and therefore average) 
contributions to the public account without learning the identity of the group members. A variation of 
this game is “repeated-play”, where this one-shot game is played over a finite number of rounds, which 
proceeds in the same manner.  
Rational self-interest suggests that an individual player has no incentive to contribute, so 
economists' prediction is that the outcome of this process will be zero contribution. Experimental 
research on public goods games though has shown that after 10 rounds of repeated play, contribution 
is rather high in the beginning and decreases over time, but never drops to zero. This means that 
people are not as self-interested as theory suggests, given that contributions are high in the beginning, 
but over time, self-interested behavior becomes more pronounced and free-riding increases.  
Fehr and Gächter in [[15]] identified punishment as a mechanism to maintain cooperation in 
public goods experiments. Free riding generally causes very strong negative emotions among 
cooperators and there is a widespread willingness to punish free riders. Fehr and Gächter conducted 
an experiment with and without punishment opportunities and proved that when punishment was not 
possible, complete free-riding was the dominant strategy. On the contrary, in the treatment with 
punishment contribution rates increased, even though punishment was costly for the punishers.  
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Fischbacher et al. in [[19]] investigated how conditional cooperation can improve contribution 
in a public goods experiment, i.e., people who want to contribute the more to a public good the more 
others contribute. Conditional cooperation can be considered as a motivation on its own or be a 
sequence of some fairness preferences like altruism, warm-glow or reciprocity. Researchers conducted 
a novel experiment, where the main task of the individuals was to indicate for each average 
contribution level of other group members, how much they wanted to contribute to the public good. 
The results of the experiment showed that a third of the subjects can be characterized as free-riders 
and that roughly 50% of the subjects showed conditional behavior, meaning that their own 
contribution increased in the other group members’ average contribution. Considering this result, 
Fischbacher et al. suggested that the often observed decay of cooperation in a repeated public goods 
game can be explained as a reaction to other players’ contributions.  
Anderson and Holt in [[2]] in their study on Experimental Economics and Public Choice 
summarized the factors that affect contribution. Among the ones that have a positive effect are: a) 
Marginal per capita return – MPCR, which is the private benefit of the contributors, b) Internal Return 
(one’s private return), c) External Return (benefit to others), d) Group Size and e) Communication. 
Repetition and Experience have a negative effect on contribution whereas Anonymity seems to not 
influence contribution at all.  
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4 Contribution in virtual communities 
As discussed earlier in the typology of virtual communities, there is a fundamental question as 
to Why people get engaged and cooperate in virtual communities. What motivates them to participate, 
invest time and effort and help others that they have not met before and probably will never meet in 
the future? Motivation is a powerful mechanism that underlies people’s behavior. It is a psychological 
feature that arouses an individual to act towards a desired goal and elicits, controls, and sustains 
certain goal-directed behaviors. It can be considered a driving force that makes people act in a certain 
manner.  
4.1 Motivation Types 
Motivation can be divided into two types, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Intrinsic 
motivation is the one that arises from within the individual. It refers to motivation driven by a 
personal interest or enjoyment in the task itself and does not rely on external pressure or rewards. 
Intrinsic motivation occurs when an activity satisfies basic human needs for competence, control, and 
autonomy. This makes the activity interesting and likely to be performed for its own sake. Extrinsic 
motivation, on the other hand, comes from outside the individual. It involves engaging in a behavior in 
order to earn external rewards or avoid punishments. These rewards can be tangible, e.g., money, 
trophies or psychological such as social recognition, glory or praise. Sometimes people do not get 
direct payments or recognition, but hope that participating in an activity will increase the likelihood of 
their earning future payments, as in cases where people perform a task in order to enhance their 
professional reputation or improve their skills.  
Between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations there exist some motivations that are considered as 
a mixture of intrinsic and extrinsic; they are clearly not intrinsic at the outset, but undergo an 
internalization process that moves them away from strictly extrinsic motivations. These incentives are 
called internalized extrinsic motivations. This internalization occurs when individuals assimilate 
external incentives and transform them into their own motives and lead to self-regulation. This type of 
incentive will be discussed in the sequel5.3.  
Apart from the intrinsic and extrinsic incentives that motivate people, there are also a number of 
social mechanisms that generate incentives, which in turn influence people’s behavior. The ones met 
most frequently in virtual communities will be also discussed in this section. 
4.1.1 Motivation Crowding Effect  
The phenomenon that external intervention (e.g., monetary incentives or punishment) may 
either undermine (crowd-out) or strengthen (crowd-in) intrinsic motivation is called the motivation 
crowding effect. This effect was first mentioned by Titmuss in his book The Gift Relationship (1970), 
who argued that paying for blood would reduce the willingness to donate blood. At that time there was 
not any empirical evidence, but since then this phenomenon has been widely researched in social 
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psychology. The theories of intrinsic motivation emanating from social psychology have been 
integrated into economic theory. But the crowding-out effect is one of the most important anomalies in 
economics, as it suggests the opposite of the most fundamental economic law, that raising monetary 
incentives increases supply. Now it is admitted by both social scientists and economists that 
motivation can be negatively affected when a previously non-monetary relationship is transformed 
into an explicitly monetary one.  
Standard economic theory does not usually differentiate between intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation and the reason for this is that it is difficult to determine which part of the employee’s 
motivation to perform his task is intrinsic and which not. Motivation Crowding Theory tries to mediate 
between the standard economic model and psychological theories.  
Motivation Crowding Theory suggests that the psychological conditions under which the 
crowding effect appears are:  
a) External interventions crowd-out intrinsic motivation when people perceive it as 
controlling. In this case people feel controlled and self-determination decreases.  
b) External interventions crowd-in intrinsic motivation when people perceive it as 
supportive. In this case people feel that they are given more freedom, so self-determination 
increases.  
An extensive meta-study in psychology that reviewed more than 120 studies about the 
motivation crowding effect confirmed that tangible rewards indeed crowd-out intrinsic motivation. 
The only case when this does not apply is when the reward is unexpected or not contingent on task 
behavior. The main negative effect of rewards is that they undermine self-regulation, so people take 
less responsibility for motivating themselves. Also, when external motives are given in order to lead 
people towards more efficient choices from a welfare point of view, this fails because it absolves people 
from moral obligations. 
The motivation crowding effect has been researched in other areas such as children’s learning 
behavior, work conditions in a firm, the reaction of managers to various forms of supervision by their 
superiors, the readiness to accept nuclear waste repositories (“not in my backyard” or NIMBY-
problem), the amount of civic virtue exhibited (e.g., tax morale). All these cases have revealed that 
rewards can control people’s behavior. The crowding-in and crowding-out effect exist when external 
rewards are given [[21]].  
4.2 Social Comparison 
Social comparison can be described as the process where people compare themselves to others. 
It was first described and analyzed by Festinger in [[16]], who proposed nine hypotheses under which 
social comparison processes take place. His theory was based mostly on comparisons of abilities, 
emotions or personality traits and very little on comparisons of opinions.  
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Festinger set the basics for social comparison theory and a lot of research has been done after 
that. There are three fundamental questions that Social Comparison theory addresses:  a. Why Do 
people Engage in Social Comparisons? b. To Whom Do People Compare Themselves?, c. How do 
Social Comparisons Influence the Self? 
a. Why Do People Engage in Social Comparisons?  
People’s tendency to engage in social comparisons is based on motivational considerations. One 
basic reason is the need to know themselves. People have a basic need to maintain an accurate self-
view, therefore they seek information feedback about their characteristics and abilities. Another reason 
is the need to create and maintain a positive self-image. A third need that is fulfilled by social 
comparison is the need to self-improve. All these can be characterized as strategic processes, which are 
executed in order to satisfy certain motives and needs such as self-evaluation, self-enhancement and 
self-improvement. People not always engage in social comparison intentionally. There are times when 
this happens spontaneously and without intention. This means that there are additional reasons why 
people compare with others. One reason is that information about characteristics, abilities and 
performance concerns attributes that are defined in a relative rather than absolute manner. Moreover 
comparisons allow people to process information in a more efficient way compared to the processing 
of information of absolute models. Social comparison requires less processing capacity, so it can be an 
efficient way of self-evaluation, because the less information people have to consider, the faster they 
come to a conclusion.  
b. To Whom Do People Compare Themselves? 
People compare themselves with others in different ways according to the motive they need to 
fulfill. Since there are three basic motives that underlie social comparison, there are also three kinds of 
comparisons respectively. In the case of self-evaluation the selection of similar others is important, 
because only comparisons with similar standards provide diagnostic information about one’s self. A 
comparison with someone with much different characteristics provides little information and cannot 
be helpful for a person to evaluate himself. Comparison with similar others is also called lateral 
comparison. In the case of self-enhancement, that is the need to maintain a positive self-view, people 
make comparisons with inferior others (downward comparison). This kind of comparison has the 
potential to protect or enhance one’s self-view and people with a threatened self-view have a tendency 
to engage in downward comparisons. Finally the need to self-improve is fulfilled by comparisons to 
superior others (upward comparison). This kind of comparison motivates people and provides 
information on how to make progress. Usually one selects people with slightly superior characteristics 
for comparison. If comparison is made to someone with extremely superior standards, this could have 
the opposite result, because people could react defensively.  
Finding a comparison standard is not always a simple task. Often, there seem to be too many 
choices and too little time. There is a case where people follow routines in selecting social comparison 
standards, in order to simplify the complex task of selecting a standard. In this case people simply 
compare with those standards they routinely use for comparison. The more often a particular 
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comparison is carried out, the more accessible and efficient the process of relating one’s attributes to 
this standard becomes, and the more likely one is to further engage in this specific comparison.  
c. How Do Social Comparisons Influence the Self? 
Social comparisons influence self-perception, affective reactions, motivation and behavior. 
Research has shown that there are a lot of consequences of social comparisons on the self. The 
question however is to which direction this influence goes. When people compare themselves to 
others, this comparison can result to assimilation or to a contrast effect.  
Assimilation happens when people take in new information or experiences and incorporate 
them into their own existing ideas. In this way they tend to modify experience or information 
somewhat to fit in with their preexisting beliefs.  
The contrast effect is a phenomenon where people perceive greater or lesser differences than are 
actually present as a result of immediately prior or simultaneous exposure to a stimulus with similar 
base characteristics, but different value. 
When assimilation occurs, judgments are correlated positively, meaning that people evaluate 
themselves to be better after a comparison with a high than a low standard. When contrast effect 
occurs, judgments are correlated negatively, meaning that people evaluate themselves to be worse after 
comparing to a high than a low/inferior standard. 
One important factor that comparison leads to assimilation or to a contrast effect is self-
construal. Construals are how individuals perceive, comprehend, and interpret the world around them, 
particularly the behavior or action of others towards themselves.  
There are also additional factors that make comparisons lead to assimilation or contrast. These 
are the extremity of the standard, the ambiguity of self-knowledge, whether the standard belongs to 
the ingroup or outgroup, whether one cooperates or competes with the standard, logical closeness 
between the self and the standard, etc..  The contrast effect is more likely to happen if the standard is 
an extreme standard, if it belongs to an outgroup or if the self-knowledge holds clear implications for 
the upcoming self-evaluation. On the other hand, social comparison may result in assimilation if the 
standard is a moderate one, if it belongs to the same category as the self (ingroup), or if the self-
knowledge is ambiguous concerning the dimension on which self-evaluation occurs.  
Finally, another factor which determines whether comparison may lead to assimilation or 
contrast is the perceived similarity of the self and the standard. When people believe that the standard 
is similar to them (similarity testing) this leads to assimilation, whereas when the standard is 
perceived to be different that the self, this leads to the contrast effect.  
4.3 Social Identity - Similarity 
In social identity theory the self is reflexive in that it can take itself as an object and can 
categorize, classify or name itself in particular ways in relation to other social categories or 
D2: Collective Awareness Platforms: Privacy, incentives and market dimensions 
 
08 May 2015 FP7-288021 – ©The EINS Consortium Page 22 of 68 
 
classifications. This process is called self-categorization and through this process an identity is formed. 
A social identity is a person’s knowledge that he or she belongs to a social category or group. A social 
group is a set of people who view themselves as members of the same social category, in which they 
share common attitudes, beliefs, values, affective reactions, behavioral norms, styles of speech etc.. 
Through a social comparison process, persons who are similar to the self are categorized with the self 
and are labeled the “in-group”, whereas persons who differ from the self are categorized as the “out-
group”. When people form a social identity, there are two basic processes involved: self-categorization 
and social comparison. The perceived similarities between the self and other members of the in-group 
and the perceived differences between the self and members of out-group make people categorize 
themselves accordingly. The social categories in which people place themselves are part of a structured 
society and exist only to other contrasting categories; each has more or less power, prestige, status and 
so on. These categories precede people. People are born into an already structured society. A person 
derives his identity from the social category he belongs. However, he can become a member of unique 
combinations of categories over the years; therefore the set of social identities making up the person’s 
self concept is unique [[52]]. 
The need to identify communities is of great importance in sociology, biology and computer 
science where systems are often represented as graphs. When a social network is represented as a 
graph, community detection is finding groups of vertices within which connections are dense, but 
between which connections are sparser. This heterogeneity of connections suggests that the network 
has certain natural divisions within it. In social networks for example, nodes tend to create tightly knit 
groups characterized by high density of ties, which is measured by the clustering coefficient - a 
measure of the degree to which nodes in a graph tend to cluster together. Identifying meaningful 
community structure in social networks is a hard problem, because of the extreme size of real networks 
and also because of the sparseness of it. 
 
Figure 3: A small network displaying community structure, with three groups of nodes with dense internal 
connections and sparser connections between groups 
In the simplest case, a network can be represented by a set of nodes or vertices joined in pairs by 
lines or edges. The problem of finding good divisions of networks has been studied for some decades in 
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computer science and sociology, which have developed different approaches. Newman in [[36]] 
presented both traditional and more recent approaches for community detection as follows. The 
method used in computer science is graph partitioning – the division of vertices of the network into a 
number of groups with roughly equal size, which is done by algorithms like Spectral Bisection or The 
Kernighan-Lin algorithm. In sociology the principal technique is hierarchical clustering. The idea 
behind this technique is to define a similarity measure quantifying some type of similarity between 
node pairs. Having this similarity measure, one groups similar nodes into communities according to 
this measure. Apart from these traditional approaches for community detection, other more recent 
algorithms have been implemented that can apply to general network analysis, like the Girvan and 
Newman algorithm and its variations. 
4.4 Social Loafing and Social Facilitation 
Social loafing and social facilitation are both social mechanisms that are closely related with co-
operation or at least with the presence of others. These two mechanisms were originally considered as 
separate areas of research in social psychology, but it turns out that they are closely related. 
Social loafing has been described as the process where participants working together put out 
less effort than participants working alone. The phenomenon was originally reported by Ringelmann 
(1913), who noticed that students working together pulled on a rope with less force than was expected 
on the basis of their individual efforts. The term social loafing was introduced later by Latane (1979), 
who described it as a reduction in effort and demonstrated results for both sexes on tasks requiring 
physical effort (clapping, pumping air, shouting) or cognitive effort (reacting to proposals, 
brainstorming, solving mazes). In Latane’s description the loafing effect is a “group vs individual” 
effect, meaning that the only criterion that mattered was the number of people performing a task and 
not other parameters that influenced people’s performance.  
Social facilitation on the other hand is the tendency for people to act better on simple tasks in 
the mere presence of others. This effect was first noticed by Triplett (1898) who found that children 
reeled more fishing line when working alongside other children compared to working alone.  The term 
“social facilitation” was coined later by Allport (1924), who is considered the founder of social 
psychology. The usual findings in social facilitation research were that working together leads to 
enhanced performance on simple tasks and debilitated performance on complex ones. The explanation 
given by Triplett was that people acted competitively in the presence of others, while later Zajong 
(1965) offered a drive interpretation of this phenomenon. This activation theory that Zajong 
introduced was the most parsimonious theoretical explanation for facilitation effects for a decade, 
although there was controversy over whether it was the mere presence of others that increased drive or 
the fact that these others were associated with evaluation. 
A quick observation of these two paradigms of social facilitation and social loafing leads to a 
contradictory result: Both tasks (reeling line and pulling rope) are similar and simple tasks, but in the 
first one working together leads to better performance than working alone, while in the second 
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working together has the opposite effect.  Harkins (1987) examined both effects under another 
perspective, which was evaluation. He showed that the two effects are closely related and not 
contradictory, in fact they are complementary. Harkins in [[24]] argued that experimental conditions 
in loafing and facilitation fall into three cells of a 2 (Alone vs. Co-action) x 2 (Evaluation vs. No 
Evaluation) factorial design. He ran experiments that realized these conditions and concluded that the 
most important factors that influenced the participants’ behavior were the number of participants and 
evaluation. This agrees with the idea that the mere presence of others plays an important role in 
performance (facilitation). Harkins also showed that there is no difference in the research results in 
the two theories, but that they are complementary. In facilitation research, when people work together, 
they produce better results than working alone. In loafing research, the results are pooled (meaning 
that there is no evaluation) and that explains why participants do not try as hard as they would if they 
were alone. In both cases evaluation is critical: the possibility of evaluation is increased by co-action in 
facilitation cases whereas the possibility of evaluation is small in loafing cases. 
4.4.1 The N-Effect 
Another factor that has an impact on social facilitation is the number of participants that take 
place in a task. As mentioned above social facilitation is the tendency for people to act better on simple 
tasks in the mere presence of others. This holds for a limited number of participants. But when “a few 
others” become “many”, then competitive motivation decreases resulting in decrease of the facilitation 
effect. A recent study by Garcia and Tor in [[23]] regarding the number of participants in a task 
revealed that there is a boundary condition in social facilitation. This phenomenon is called the N-
Effect and it is the discovery that increasing the number of competitors (N) can decrease the 
motivation to compete.  
Garcia and Tor conducted a number of experiments that showed that the N-Effect is an 
important factor linked to the social comparison process. The factors that were originally examined by 
Festinger [[16]] as those that amplify competition were subjective factors. Later studies introduced 
that also objective, contextual factors influence the motivation to compete. The N-Effect continues in 
this direction revealing the impact of a ubiquitous contextual factor – the number of competitors – on 
social comparison and thus on competitive motivation.  
4.4.2 The Collective Effort Model 
The importance of social loafing and the free-rider problem has led to the development of 
research in this area. Karau and Williams in [[26]] developed the Collective Effort Model, a theory to 
explain why people often work harder individually than in groups. According to this theory, people 
work hard when they think their effort will help them achieve outcomes that they value. Working in a 
group can influence how hard people work, because it can change their perception of the importance of 
their contribution to achieving a specified level of performance, their likelihood of reaching the goal, 
and the value they place on the outcomes they gain by their efforts. 
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Karau and William analyzed 78 studies and stated that social loafing is a robust phenomenon 
and generalizes across tasks and populations. They found that variables such as evaluation potential, 
expectations of co-workers’ performance, task meaningfulness and culture, have strong influence on 
social loafing. 
 
Figure 4: The Collective Effort Model 
 
The studies examined by Garcia and Tor showed that there is evidence of the N-Effect across 
different contexts. People can experience or anticipate social comparison concerns, when there are a 
few competitors. As the number of competitors increases, these concerns – which are an interpersonal 
information based process – become diffused by the sheer number of competitors, because it becomes 
less viable and informative for them to compare themselves with a great multitude of targets. 
Having this in mind, we may argue that in order for social facilitation to exist, the number of 
participants should remain low, because adding too many competitors may dampen rather than 
enhance the motivation to compete. 
4.5 Privacy/Trust 
All various instances of virtual communities are fundamentally dependent on grassroots 
participation and information sharing. However, the information that a platform requires to properly 
work and deliver a targeted utility is acknowledged as a sensitive asset.  People have a right to privacy, 
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and if their privacy is compromised, their trust in the platform could decrease and even make them 
cease contributing. A domino effect is possible if news about privacy breaches reach other users. 
4.5.1 Privacy/Trust in Virtual Communities 
According to Ridings et al in [[43]] trust can be defined as an implicit set of beliefs that the 
other party will refrain from opportunistic behavior and will not take advantage of the situation. In 
traditional communities research has shown that people work together with others they trust and 
avoid contact with those they do not trust. In virtual communities however, trust is somehow different 
because people may never actually meet in person. This luck of face-to-face contact and visual cues 
and also the fact that people can present a fake identity regarding age, gender or other personal 
information do not favor the development of trust. On the other hand there are factors that foster the 
development of trust, such as, the closeness developed by the common mutual interest in the 
community’s topic, repeated interaction with others, open public replies and debate of messages. In 
any case however, when rules do not provide sufficient guarantees that others will behave as they are 
expected to, which is often the case in virtual communities, trust serves as a subjective substitute for 
such rules, creating the necessary atmosphere that makes engagement with others more open.  
Research on trust has supported that trust is multidimensional, consisting of three distinct 
beliefs or factors: ability, benevolence and integrity. Ability is skills or competencies that enable an 
individual to have influence on a certain area. This applies to virtual communities, because they are 
centered around a specific mutual interest, hobby, event or occupation. Benevolence is the 
expectation that others will have a positive orientation or a desire to do good to the trustee. Integrity 
is the expectation that someone will act in accordance with socially accepted standards of honesty or a 
set of principles that the trust accepts, such as not telling a lie and providing verified information. 
Ridings et al. in [43] argue that the three dimensions of trust that apply in traditional communities 
can be combined into two dimensions in the context of virtual communities: ability on the one hand 
and benevolence/integrity on the other. Benevolence and integrity both lead to the same behavior, 
which is reciprocity in the form of maintaining the community conversation, and therefore are 
combined in this research. Ridings et al. also present a research model that comprised of three 
antecedents of trust that acted as the input parameters of the model, the two dimensions of trust 
(ability, benevolence/integrity) and the output parameters, which is the desire to exchange 
information (get or give). The antecedents of trust are a) Perceived responsiveness, b) Others’ 
confiding personal information and c) Disposition to trust.  
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Figure 5: Ridings et al. Research Model 
 
The methodology used to test the research model was a cross-sectional survey of virtual 
community members. In contrast with older research that took place in laboratory settings, Riding’s 
research used field survey methodology in order to maximize external validity of the actual 
membership perception regarding trust in real virtual communities. The results showed that trust is 
indeed a significant predictor of members’ desire to exchange information, and especially to get 
information. The effect of trust for getting information, rather than giving, was stronger, because trust 
is based on people’s need to depend upon others given that no enforcement rules exist to guarantee 
this behavior. 
Another finding of the research was that perceived responsiveness builds trust. When others 
reply quickly and often to messages, members in the community will have higher levels of trust. Also 
when people confide personal information, trust in others increases. Members of a community will 
trust others more when they know something personal about them. Finally disposition to trust is also 
positively related to trust in others, indicating that people who are generally trusting, exhibit more 
trust in others.  
Preserving the privacy of information that users share is acknowledged as a necessary condition 
for the success, and sustainability operation of the platforms that host the virtual communities. The 
trade-off between privacy and application utility has mostly been studied in the context of publishing 
data in a database [27].  In this context, privacy is equated with re-identifiability, rather than with, for 
example, the quantity of data disclosed: The data is anonymized and the attacker tries to link it to the 
user who produced it (i.e.,, re-identify the user). Moreover, for the most part, privacy in data 
publishing has not been studied with a specific application in mind, and hence utility metrics could 
only be generic: for instance, an anonymized database is useful if it preserves the average of all entries, 
or, more strictly, if it preserves the distribution of entries [41]. Only recently have specific privacy-
utility frameworks been proposed for concrete applications (smart meters, [46]).  There, (negative) 
utility is measured as the distortion between the true and the perturbed value of data. 
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4.5.2 Privacy/Trust in Websites 
Trust has been investigated in different perspectives in recent literature. One of them is 
Chesire’s et al. research in [[11]], which focuses on general and familiar trust in websites. General 
website trust is the individual’s context-independent attitude about trustworthiness of typical 
websites. The term familiar website trust refers to the perceptions of trustworthiness of websites and 
information systems that an individual visits frequently. Perceptions of trust related to websites that 
are a part of people’s daily habits are more circumscribed than for the general category of all websites. 
These attitudes are not only context specific but also informed by particular histories of contact and 
established patterns of regular interactions. These two types of web trust are comparable to system 
trust, which exists when a computer or information system is assumed to operate in a predictable or 
reliable way. Thus, general and familiar website trust only deal with the perceptions that individuals 
develop about websites or systems, not their interpersonal relationships mediated through 
communication technology. 
 Chesire et al. examine four parameters that influence website trust. These were  
a) Online activity,  
b) General trust and caution,  
c) Information technology knowledge and  
d) Experience of adverse online event.  
Each parameter had a different effect or relationship to website trust. For example, increased 
activity was positively related only to general website trust, which means that experience with web-
based systems is part of a reciprocal cycle of online activity and general website trust. The same did 
not hold for familiar website trust. Saying that someone who visits certain websites on a regular basis 
(familiar websites), has reduced trust in these, sounds like a paradox. One explanation is that frequent 
users become informed critics of websites in general or another explanation is that individuals who 
engage in more online activity also build a clear sense of prudence about their frequently visited 
websites. 
In order to examine their research hypotheses, researchers analyzed data from a survey of 
online behaviors and attitudes. The survey included questions regarding socio-demographic 
characteristics, frequency of online activity questions, attitudinal questions about general trust and 
caution and agreement statements related to website trust. The survey was distributed by using the 
open-source survey tool to a sample of 970 people. 
General trust and general caution showed strong positive relationships with general and 
familiar website trust. Individuals with the greatest levels of general trust and caution were associated 
with the highest amounts of general and familiar website trust. Just as in offline interactions, the most 
rewarding and prudent long-term strategy may couple high trust with high caution on the Internet.  
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The next factor examined was the knowledge of information technology. Research showed that 
it has a positive influence on both general and familiar website trust. People with high IT knowledge 
believe they have the capability to assess accurately the trustworthiness of the sites they use on a 
regular basis (familiar website trust) as well as websites more broadly (general website trust).  
Trust is also related to with the experience of adverse events on the web, but not in the way we 
may think. Results showed that general website trust decreases after a bad incident on the web, but 
familiar website trust does not. This happens because people could change their daily habits, thus 
making familiar websites self-correcting. Moreover, familiar websites become a part of life in the same 
way preferred organizations or companies do. When individuals develop a loyal relationship with 
websites and then experience an adverse event, it can create a contradictory relationship between 
perceptions known in social psychology as “cognitive dissonance”. When an individual is faced with a 
salient contradiction between a belief and a relevant behavior, the individual will either escape the 
conflict entirely or change the belief or behavior to reduce the importance of any one of the dissonant 
elements [[17]]. In the online context, the positive emotions and attitudes that people experience from 
website dependability can conflict with the negative consequences of a major adverse event such as a 
phishing attack or significant loss of data. If it is too difficult or impractical to change daily habits by 
avoiding certain websites, many individuals may resolve the cognitive dissonance created by an 
adverse event by choosing to believe that the adverse event was not so bad after all or that it is 
unlikely to reoccur. 
 
Table 2: Comparison of factors related to trust 
Ridings et al.  Chesire et al. 
Perceived Responsiveness Online activity 
Ability Information Technology Knowledge 
Disposition to trust General Trust and Caution  
 
Comparing the two researches presented in this review, Rindings’ and Chesire’s, we can see a 
few differences. First, Ridings deals with trust in virtual communities, whereas Chesire deals with 
trust in websites, which include virtual communities. Although the two approaches examine different 
factors that influence trust, it is possible to draw parallels between them (Ref.Table 2). In any case, 
trust is indisputably a major issue that influences individuals’ behavior in virtual communities, and 
has to be examined carefully when a virtual community is developed. 
4.5.3 The Privacy-Utility Tradeoff 
We contribute original research that quantifies the tradeoff between user privacy and utility in 
the context of a user community in a location-based service [50]. We also refer the reader to EINS 
JRA5 Deliverable 5.2 [7] in which this research has also been reported. 
D2: Collective Awareness Platforms: Privacy, incentives and market dimensions 
 
08 May 2015 FP7-288021 – ©The EINS Consortium Page 30 of 68 
 
4.6 Altruism 
Altruism is the principle or practice of concern for the welfare of others. It is a traditional virtue 
in many cultures and a core aspect of various religious traditions. Altruism is the opposite of 
selfishness. Pure altruism consists of sacrificing time, energy or possessions for someone other than 
the self without expecting any compensation or benefits, either direct, or indirect. Altruism has been a 
topic in various areas of research, like psychology, sociology, anthropology, neurobiology. Regardless 
of the perspective of each research though, altruism is always caring about the welfare of other people 
and acting to support them. 
In this deliverable, we examine altruism from the psychological perspective. The International 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences defines psychological altruism as “a motivational state with the 
goal of increasing another’s welfare”. There has been some debate on whether or not humans are truly 
capable of psychological altruism. Some definitions specify a self-sacrificial nature to altruism and a 
lack of external rewards for altruistic behaviors. However, altruism ultimately benefits the self in many 
cases. Thus, the selflessness of altruistic acts is brought to question. The social exchange theory 
postulates that altruism only exists when benefits outweigh costs. Also the theory of psychological 
egoism suggests that no act of sharing, helping or sacrificing can be described as truly altruistic, as the 
actor may receive an intrinsic reward in the form of personal gratification. But the validity of this 
argument depends on whether intrinsic rewards qualify as "benefits."  
The empathy-altruism hypothesis states that psychological altruism does exist and is evoked by 
the empathic desire to help someone who is suffering. Research has found that people are most likely 
to help if they recognize that a person is in need and feel personal responsibility for reducing the 
person's distress. Individuals are also affected by the number of bystanders witnessing distress (the 
Bystander affect). Usually when the number of bystanders increases, people feel that it is not their 
responsibility to help, so they act less altruistically. However, a witness with a high level of empathic 
concern is likely to feel  personal responsibility regardless of the number of bystanders. 
Finally, volunteerism can be seen as a form of altruism. Several studies on this area have shown 
that volunteers have increased life satisfaction and significantly resulted in less depression and 
anxiety. People who volunteer have better physical and mental health. This adds to the assertion that 
when people act altruistically, they indeed receive intrinsic rewards and feel personal gratification 
[[1]].  
4.7 Social Approval 
Social approval, in the context of virtual communities, is analyzed by Chesire in [[9]] as a 
selective incentive that influences people’s behavior regarding contribution. It involves the ability to 
have one’s contributions evaluated by others in the community and/or evaluate the contributions of 
others. People care about what others think about the information they share, so the rating they will 
get will affect their future contribution in the community. When individuals contribute to a virtual 
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community, they gain some intrinsic satisfaction from the popularity of their own contributions in the 
form of psychological efficacy, leading to an increased desire to share more in the future. As more 
people acknowledge someone’s contribution as desirable, the popularity of his contribution increases. 
Social approval is a two-direction process, since members of a virtual community in addition to 
receiving social approval, may participate in giving social approval by rating the popularity of other’s 
contributions. Thus, it is possible for giving and receiving social approval to affect behavior. 
Individuals may cooperate because they care about their popularity rating (receive social approval) 
and/or because they want to vote on the contributions of others (give social approval). Social approval 
is a combination of both processes. 
This kind of social approval is completely restricted to the individual, meaning that the person 
that receives social approval is the only one who knows his popularity rating and thus, is totally 
different from public reputation, where someone’s popularity is available to other members of the 
group. In the latter case, the incentives that motivate people to contribute are different and more 
related to the social desirability bias incentive, which is presented next. 
4.8 Social Desirability Bias 
Antin and Shaw in [[5]] describe social desirability bias as the tendency of people to deny 
socially undesirable traits or qualities and admit to desirable ones. The theory of social desirability bias 
suggests it is primarily the result of two underlying social psychological processes. First, it is 
impression management, in the sense that because one wants to be socially desirable, makes an effort 
to mold his/her public image and to construct a favorable presentation of self based on expectations, 
norms, and beliefs about a given context. Secondly, social desirability can be a form of self-deception. 
In this respect, social desirability is often an attempt to deny one’s “true” attitudes, or mask an 
underlying belief by expressing a contradictory one. Social desirability is often subtle, unconscious, 
and based on implicit attitudes which individuals are not aware of or able to express.  
Researchers have found social desirability bias in survey responses on many controversial topics 
such as immigration, affirmative action, and racial prejudice. Several studies have documented 
pervasive biases in behavioral and attitudinal scales commonly used in organizational behavior 
research and also in marketing research. When survey studies are conducted, this effect has to be 
taken into account, because it can produce inaccurate results which misrepresent the “true” prevalence 
of attitudes. 
4.9 Observational cooperation 
Chesire in [[9]] described observational cooperation as the ability to monitor the total amount of 
contributed information in a generalized information exchange system. Observing cooperation in the 
network can influence contributions because individuals tend to orient themselves towards the average 
behavior of other group members. When people observe how much others are contributing, they 
stimulate a normative response to reciprocate by cooperating as well. Thus reactive behavior is closely 
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tied to reciprocity. Chesire argued that individuals are likely to imitate the perceived aggregate actions 
of others when observing cooperative behavior either through a sense of normative compliance or a 
sense of obligation. 
4.10 Uniqueness 
Apart from people’s need for similarity which brings affiliation, belief validation, emotional 
security, liking and social influence, people also have the need for uniqueness. Interpersonal difference 
or uniqueness contributes to self-identity, attracts attention and enhances self-esteem and social 
status. Uniqueness theory was developed by Snyder and Fromkin in 1980 in their book “Uniqueness: 
The Human Pursuit of Difference”, where they stated that people seek to establish and maintain a 
sense of moderate self-distinctiveness, because perceptions of either extreme similarity or extreme 
dissimilarity are experienced as unpleasant. The basic idea of uniqueness theory is that everyone has a 
need or desire to be moderately dissimilar to others. As described by Snyder and Fromkin, the 
uniqueness motivation has three explanations. The first one is that people are in fact moderately 
different form one another and have learned to perceive themselves accordingly. Second, people learn 
to value a sense of uniqueness in environments that encourage freedom and independence. Third, 
people prefer a moderate level of self-distinctiveness because they have needs for social acceptance, 
approval and validation as well as for uniqueness.  
Snyder and Fromkin developed the first scale for measuring the need for uniqueness, known as 
the NU scale, by incorporating 32 items that were correlated according to uniqueness. Critics of NU 
scale argued that it put too much emphasis on public and socially risky displays of uniqueness, 
whereas people also pursue uniqueness in more private and socially acceptable ways. Another 
approach to measure uniqueness was made by Lynn and Harris in 1997, who created the self-
attributed need for uniqueness (SANU) scale. This scale was accepted as a valid measure of uniqueness 
motives and it also approached distinctiveness in more socially acceptable ways.  
There are many dimensions where people can pursue self-uniqueness. For example, when 
people are asked to describe themselves, they mention their abilities, appearance, beliefs, behavior, 
families, friends, possessions or hobbies. Snyder and Fromkin suggested that people prefer to be 
unique on attributes that are highly relevant to their self-concepts and that do not lead to social 
rejection. Lynn and Snyder in [[32]], who analyzed previous research regarding uniqueness, suggested 
that people are more likely to pursue uniqueness on attributes that are already self-defining, on 
attributes whose rarity is difficult to falsify, and on attributes whose rarity satisfies more than 
uniqueness needs.  
When uniqueness theory was first presented, the dominant view of interpersonal differences 
had a negative meaning. The message from social psychology was that similarity leads to social 
acceptance. It was after the research conducted by Snyder and Fromkin, that uniqueness gained a 
more positive meaning and proved itself to bring personal and social benefits. 
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4.11 Reciprocity 
Reciprocity in social psychology refers to responding to a positive action with another positive 
action. Reciprocity is an extrinsic incentive, when seen from the contributor’s view, in the sense that 
when one cooperates or contributes, he expects a return. But besides been driven by incentives, 
reciprocity can also derive from a desire to repay the help or knowledge received from the community 
before. 
4.11.1 Reciprocity Types 
Reciprocity is one of the fundamental ways that enhances cooperation. Novak in [[37]], who is 
the director of the Program for Evolutionary Dynamics at Harvard University, states that direct 
reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity and group selection are four of the five rules for 
the evolution of cooperation.  
Direct reciprocity 
Direct reciprocity happens when repeated encounters between the same two individuals take 
place. In every round each player has a choice between cooperation and defection. If one cooperates 
now, then the other one may cooperate later and this way it might payoff to cooperate. As mentioned 
in Section 3.4.13.4.1, this is the case of repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Also, the best strategy according 
to Axelrod in [[6]] was Tit-for-Tat. Novak argues that this strategy is an efficient catalyst of 
cooperation in a society where nearly everybody is a defector, but another strategy called “win-stay, 
lose-shift” exposes stronger potential to maintain cooperation. “Win-stay, lose-shift” is a simpler 
strategy of Tit-For-Tat and the idea is to repeat a previous move when doing well and changing 
otherwise.  
Indirect reciprocity 
Although direct reciprocity is a powerful mechanism for the evolution of cooperation, it does not 
cover all aspects of human nature. There are cases when a person who receives help, cannot help the 
donor directly. For example people donate to charities that do not donate back to them. Direct 
reciprocity is like a barter economy based on the immediate exchange of goods, whereas indirect 
reciprocity is like the invention of money. Indirect reciprocity is the case where randomly chosen pair-
wise encounters between members of a population take place. In this case, it is not possible for two 
individuals to constantly interact with each other. One individual acts as donor and the other as 
recipient and the same two individuals need not meet again. The mechanism that helps indirect 
reciprocity is reputation. When someone helps somebody else, this establishes a good reputation, 
which will be rewarded by others. This interaction – helping behavior – is observed by individuals who 
might inform others. In this way reputation allows evolution of cooperation by indirect reciprocity.  
This kind of reciprocity is met in animals in simple forms, but only humans are able to engage in 
the full complexity of the game. The reason is that indirect reciprocity has high demands of cognitive 
skills. People must remember their own interactions and also be aware of the ever-changing social 
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network of the group. Moreover language is needed in order to spread the gossip (reputation) 
associated with indirect reciprocity. 
Network reciprocity 
The argument that defection is the natural selection is based on a well-mixed population, where 
everybody interacts equally likely with everybody else. But real populations are not well mixed and 
spatial structures or social networks imply that some individuals interact more often than others. In 
order to study how spatial structure affects evolutionary dynamics, evolutionary graph theory is 
introduced. 
In evolutionary graph theory, individuals of the population occupy the vertices of a graph and 
the edges determine who interacts with whom. In network reciprocity a cooperator pays a cost for each 
neighbor to receive a benefit. A defector pays no costs and his neighbors receive no benefit. In this 
setting, cooperators can prevail by forming network clusters where they can help each other.   
Group selection 
Selection exists not only on individuals but also on groups. In a simple model of group selection, 
a population is subdivided into groups. Cooperators help others in their own group and defectors do 
not help. When individuals contribute, they reproduce proportionally to their payoff and offspring is 
added to the same group. If a group reaches a certain size, then it splits into two. Because there is a 
constraint on the population size, another group will become extinct. In this scenario, there is 
competition between groups. Some groups grow faster than others and split more often. In fact, pure 
cooperator groups grow faster than pure defector groups, whereas in a mixed group, defectors 
reproduce faster than cooperators. This model is based on “group fecundity selection”, where group of 
cooperators have a high rate of splitting into two. There is also “group viability selection”, where group 
of cooperators have small probability to go extinct. In any model of group selection though, group 
selection favors cooperation. 
Novak supported that all these types of reciprocity under certain conditions, which take into 
account the cost-to-benefit ratio of the altruistic, the reputation and the number of neighbors 
(according to the reciprocity type selected) lead to the evolution of cooperation.  
4.11.2 Reciprocity Motives 
The concept of reciprocity and its types, as presented above, has been studied in the context of 
evolutionary biology, but reciprocity applies to social phenomena as well. Ye et al. in [[57]] examined 
the motives that develop reciprocity in online communities. They examined reciprocity from the 
receivers’ perspective based on equity theory and social identity explanation of the de-individuation 
Effects model (SIDE). The research was based on a large-scale survey in an online forum for English 
language learning. The parameters measured were a) community norm, b) indebtedness and c) 
perceived anonymity and how these parameters influence the intention to reciprocate.  
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Equity theory focuses on an individual’s perception of fairness or equity in social exchanges. An 
equitable relationship exists when individuals perceive that they are receiving relatively equal 
outcomes from the exchange compared with their inputs. A perception of inequity in an exchange 
results in the feeling of indebtedness, which motivates individuals to commit to a reciprocal behavior 
in order to avoid being perceived as socially insensitive.  
The social identity model of de-individuation effects (SIDE model) is a theory that explains the 
effects of anonymity and identifiability on group behavior. Anonymity depersonalizes social 
perceptions of others and the self. In online communities the de-individuating features (perceived 
anonymity, physical isolation and selective self-presentation) decrease perceptions of individual 
differences. This leads individuals to focus more on their self-conception, increase their adherence to 
community norms and form more positive impression about online communities.  
 
Figure 6 
Figure 6: Ye et al. Research Model for Reciprocity in Online Communities 
 
Intention to reciprocate is defined as the intention of beneficiary to return help to the 
benefactors or those who are in the benefactors’ group. 
Community norm is defined as a belief of how one ought to behave. It refers to a rule for what 
should be done, accepted, and internalized by the group members. It triggers the enforcement of the 
prescribed behavior by informal social sanctions. The more individuals are motivated to conform to 
community norms, the more their attitudes tend to be community determined than individual-
determined.  
Indebtedness is defined as a state of obligation to repay another in the context of receiving a 
benefit from another. In online communities, when members receive help from other members, they 
compare it with their own contribution. After comparison, if they find an inequity in the exchange, 
they will feel indebtedness because this is in conflict with their own positive impression and self-
perception.  
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Perceived anonymity refers to the extent to which community members cannot identify other 
members or the source of a particular contribution to the group. In online communities face-to-face 
interaction and self-regulation is absent. Anonymity of others leads to heightened self-awareness, and 
thus to greater adherence to group norms. The heightened self-awareness leads members to focus 
more on their own feelings and behaviors in the community. 
The research model showed that perceived anonymity is not only positively related to 
indebtedness and intention to reciprocate, but positively moderates the relationship between 
community norm and intention to reciprocate. Also, community norm was found to positively 
influence intention to reciprocate and indebtedness. This can be explained by the fact that anonymity 
increases individuals’ self-awareness and hence their intent to maintain a good self concept. If 
community norm is strong, perceived anonymity increases individuals’ intent to conform to 
community norms and hence reciprocate. A strong norm indicates a strong peer expectation and 
individuals tend to conform to this expectation in order to be legitimate and be liked by others. The 
results also showed that indebtedness positively affects the intention to reciprocate.  
The most interesting result of this research was the influence of perceived anonymity on 
reciprocity. Counter-intuitively, it showed that perceived anonymity enhances the intention to 
reciprocate. The de-individuating features of online communities like visual anonymity, physical 
isolation, and selective self-presentation, lead to decreased perceptions of individual differences and 
increased adherence to group norms. In order to sustain positive impression formation, people tend to 
be more prosocial and helpful to others. Thus, during the knowledge exchange in online communities, 
members who perceive people as anonymous tend to be active in reciprocating the community to 
maintain their self perception. 
Moreover, the feeling of indebtedness increases the will to reciprocate. Individuals who receive 
help in online communities are likely to believe that they are receiving help from the community as a 
whole and not from a specific individual, thus they reciprocate the community to repay the favors of 
the community.  
4.12 Goal Setting 
In [[30]] Locke and Latham summarized findings from previous research on goal setting theory. 
Goal setting theory was developed within industrial/organizational psychology during a 25-year period 
based on about 400 laboratory and field studies. These studies showed that when goals are specific 
and high, this leads to better performance, than if goals are easy or vague such as the usual “do one’s 
best”. It has been proven that when a person is committed to a goal, has the ability to attain it and does 
not have conflicting goals, then there is a positive linear relationship between goal difficulty and task 
performance.  
There are four mechanisms or moderators of the relationship between goals and performance. 
These are feedback, which people need in order to track their progress; commitment to the goal, where 
one has to view the goal as important; task complexity, where one realizes that task knowledge is 
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harder to acquire on complex tasks; and situational constraints. One such constraint is role overload - 
when the resources available are not enough for a goal to be accomplished, then goals cannot affect 
performance positively. 
Some important aspects of goal theory are the following: 
Goal Choice: The level at which a goal is set depends on self-efficacy, past performance and 
social influences. 
Learning Goals: Sometimes people focus on reaching the goal rather than on acquiring the skills 
to accomplish it. This is known as the "tunnel-vision". In such cases, it is better if a learning goal is 
assigned, that is a goal to acquire the required task knowledge. 
Framing: The framing effect in psychology means that people react to a particular choice in 
different ways depending on whether it is presented as a loss or as a gain.  Regarding goal setting, it 
has been proved that when one perceives a goal as threatening, then this influences performance 
negatively. 
Group Goals: Apart from individual ones, goals can be effective when set in groups. Groups add 
a level of complexity, because there may be conflicting goals among group members. Besides that, 
group goals have the advantage of sharing information among members, which leads to better 
performance. 
Goals can be effective when they come from different sources. They may be assigned by others, 
they can be set jointly through participation or they can be self-set. In the latter case, goals are a key 
element in self-regulation. In the context of incentives, goal setting is an intrinsic motive, when it 
comes from within the individual, whereas in all other cases goal setting is considered an extrinsic 
motive. 
4.13 Feedback 
Feedback is defined by Chesire and Antin in [[10]] as the interactive process in which 
information is returned in response to a contributor’s action. Feedback incentives take place in order 
to encourage repeat offerings to an information pool once an individual has already made at least one 
contribution. Feedback mechanisms are also called retention incentives that encourage people to 
contribute over time, in contrast with capture incentives, which aim to encourage people to contribute 
for the first time.  
Feedback can be synchronous, when it immediately follows an action and asynchronous which 
occurs at a later time, perhaps as an email or other message. In the case of synchronous feedback, 
Chesire and Antin examined 3 different types: Gratitude, Historical Reminder and Relative Ranking. 
Gratitude can be expressed as a positive emotional response to a contribution. A mild positive emotion 
such as gratitude can affect behavior in a positive way, when cost of contribution is low. Historical 
reminder simply informs contributors about their prior contribution behavior. An individual’s own 
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past behavior has been shown to be a predictor of future contributions in collective action problems. If 
people are reminded of their previous actions in the system, they may continue to contribute to it. 
Finally relative ranking is an important type of feedback and is defined as aggregated information that 
combines one’s own behavior with the average behavior of others. Research has shown that when 
people have very specific knowledge of others’ past contribution behavior, they actually reduce 
contributions to a public good. But when they have knowledge about cumulative group behavior, this 
can positively affect contributions. 
4.14 Monetary Incentives 
As discussed earlier, there are extrinsic incentives that motivate people to act towards a desired 
goal. Monetary incentives are a case of extrinsic incentives and according to the context used, they are 
designed accordingly.  
Monetary incentives have been used widely in the labor market, in the form of bonuses, stock 
options, profit sharing, raises, in order to inspire employee loyalty and increase productivity. The 
promise of a financial gain is an important motivator in markets and traditional organizations.  
Monetary incentives are also used in virtual communities to encourage the participation of their 
members. For example, a website, Wall Street Survivor, offers their members the opportunity to test 
their knowledge and hone their skills on a virtual stock market. Investors can compete to win real cash 
rewards for the best managed weekly, overall and risk-adjusted stock portfolios. Another example is a 
travel community that uses gifts to encourage participants to contribute more content on the website. 
People write reviews and upload photos for the rewards or gifts offered by the community [[29]]. 
The effect of monetary incentives has also been studied in open source software projects (OSS) 
by Roberts et al. in [[44]]. Although OSS communities do not have a profit motive and hence don’t 
offer monetary compensation to contributors, the commercial interest in the software industry is so 
pervasive, that private companies assign many of their paid employees to work on OSS projects that 
are particularly important to the company. Such cases are IBM’s involvement in Linux and Apache 
projects and Time Warner’s engagement in Mozilla. In Roberts’ research the results showed that 
monetary incentives were associated with a higher level of contributions to the source code. This is 
rather an unexpected result, since monetary and extrinsic motives in general cause the so-called 
crowding-out effect. 
4.15 Reputation 
Reputation of a person, social group or organization is an opinion about that entity, as a result 
of social evaluation on a set of criteria. Reputation may be considered as a component of identity as 
defined by others. Reputation is important in various areas like business, education, online 
communities, because it influences peoples' behavior and decisions.  
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In the context of virtual communities, where people are asked to contribute information, 
evaluate others for their contribution or make use of information from the virtual community, 
reputation matters because it enhances trust. Reputation is an important motivator for those who are 
influenced about others' opinions. In this case a social desirability component is present, which 
motivates people to act towards a way that will improve their reputation, in order to become more 
socially accepted. 
4.16 Gamification 
We could argue that the social mechanisms and intrinsic motives that affect collaboration 
mentioned in previous sections, follow human evolution from its early stages. The mechanism 
presented in this section though, is a rather new one. Gamification is the concept of applying game 
mechanics and game design techniques to make products and services more fun and engaging. The 
term was coined by Nick Pelling in 2002, a computer programmer who had the idea of using game-like 
accelerated user interface design in order to make electronic transactions both enjoyable and fast 
[[38]]. At that time gamification was intended for electronic devices and not for Web. The concept 
received a lot of attention in 2010 and 2011, when marketers realized that applying this technique 
would increase loyalty and interaction in various applications. Since then the term gamification 
became widespread in a more specific sense, referring to applying aspects of games into software.  
Gamification is based on three different areas, a) Loyalty Programs (marketing efforts that 
reward, and therefore encourage, loyal buying behavior), b) Game Design Techniques and c) 
Behavioral Economics and it has been proven that when applied to a website or platform, user 
interaction and loyalty increase drastically. The effects of gamification were soon noticed and its use 
accelerated. In a 2011 announcement, Gartner, the world's leading information technology research 
and advisory company, predicted that “over 70 percent of Global 2000 organizations will have at 
least one gamified application, and that gamification is positioned to become a significant trend in 
the next five years” [[8]]. Nowadays there are already a lot of companies that use this technique and 
also companies that have created gamification platforms and provide game mechanics as a service for 
the purposes of marketing and customer retention. The most prominent of them are Bunchball, 
BigDoor, Badgeville and IActionable.  
Some of the game mechanics used are badges, bonuses, levels, points, progression bars, 
countdown, epic meaning (when participants believe they are working to achieve something great and 
bigger than themselves), ownership (that creates loyalty), competition with other players and also 
virtual currency. According to gamification.org, i.e.,, the leading information site and community for 
the gamification trend, these techniques can be applied on various industries, such as Gamification of 
Art, Gamification of Education, Gamification of Entertainment, Gamification of Design, Gamification 
of Environment, Gamification for Social Good, etc. [[22]]. 
The importance of gamification is based on incentives. Gamification techniques strive to 
leverage people's natural desires for competition, achievement, status, self-expression, and altruism. 
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People are highly motivated by recognition. For example, making the rewards for accomplishing tasks 
visible to other players or providing leader boards are ways of encouraging players to compete. When 
people gain points, they receive psychic reward, but this reward is amplified when they can share it 
with others.  
Critics of gamification argue that this trend creates an artificial sense of achievement or that it 
can encourage unintended behaviors. In the marketing business critics argue that gamification can be 
a trick for increasing customers in the beginning and marketers should think of what will happen when 
the point system gets old, as well as what type of relationship they want to have with their customers 
[[49]]. 
In any way, various examples have shown that gamification has indeed a positive influence in 
getting people to engage and participate in virtual communities. Picking the correct mechanics and 
procedures is the key for a successful design in each case. 
4.17 Summary 
Table 3 summarizes the incentives and social mechanisms presented in this chapter and shows 
whether the underlying motive is intrinsic or extrinsic. Most of the incentives and social mechanisms 
described have intrinsic motives and only a few have purely extrinsic motives. An interesting 
observation is that intrinsic and extrinsic motivations are not mutually excluded - they may coexist in 
human behavior.  
By definition, intrinsic and extrinsic motives are both present in the motivation crowding effect. 
For example when external intervention undermines (crowd-out) or strengthens (crowd-in) intrinsic 
motivation. 
Reciprocity is an extrinsic incentive, in the sense that when one contributes, he expects a return. 
But from another point of view, reciprocity can also stem from a desire to repay the help received, 
making it an intrinsic incentive.  
Gamification can also be considered to have both intrinsic and extrinsic motives. Although game 
mechanics like badges, bonus, points etc. can be considered as external motives, the social 
mechanisms that underlie like social comparison, reputation or group identification have to do with 
intrinsic motives. 
Table 3: A complete list of incentives and social mechanisms where intrinsic and/or extrinsic motives are 
present 
Incentive / Social Mechanism Intrinsic Extrinsic 
Motivation Crowding Effect X X 
Social Comparison X  
Social Identity X  
Social Loafing and Social Facilitation X  
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Trust X  
Altruism X  
Social Approval X  
Social Desirability Bias X  
Observational Cooperation  X  
Uniqueness X  
Reciprocity X X 
Goal Setting X X 
Feedback  X 
Reputation X  
Monetary Incentives  X 
Gamification X X 
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5 Cooperation in virtual communities 
This chapter presents examples of cooperation based on recent research, which have 
investigated how different types of incentives and social mechanisms affect contributions in online 
communities. According to the type, purpose, quantity of contribution, context or other characteristics 
of each virtual community presented, different incentives are important. The examples are thus 
classified according to Environment/Type of virtual community, Number of users, Cooperation, 
Experiment method, and Incentives and/or social mechanisms present. For each experiment, results 
follow. 
5.1 Selective Incentives and Generalized Information Exchange 
In [[9]] Chesire investigated how generalized exchange systems emerge, when information, as 
the object of exchange, produces a collective good. When people contribute information for a collective 
benefit, they are engaged in a social dilemma. Two properties of information, replication and high 
jointness of supply, are crucial for understanding the nature of social dilemma in this kind of exchange 
systems. Chesire argues that these special features of information combined with low cost of 
contribution, can allow social psychological selective incentives to significantly encourage cooperation 
in generalized information exchange systems. The two incentives examined were social approval and 
observational cooperation. 
Environment/Type of virtual community 
The area where research was conducted was generalized information exchange systems. A 
generalized exchange system can be defined as a system where the reward that an actor receives is 
usually not directly contingent on the resources provided by that actor. When the object of exchange is 
information, then this is the case of generalized information exchange. Such systems are open source 
software and P2P file sharing networks.  
The nature of the object of exchange plays an important role in social exchange. Information, 
which was examined in this paper as the object of exchange, has two important properties: a) 
information has the quality of replication, which means that information can be transferred without 
the original owner losing his copy. As a result the contributor does not lose the information he shared. 
b) information can be consumed by many individuals without losing much or any value at all. Thus 
information can have high jointness of supply. Jointness of supply refers to the way that consumption 
of the public good affects the availability of that good for other individuals. Information that is 
transmitted over the internet is an ideal example of how jointness of supply and replication can 
operate in information exchange.  
Number of users that participate in the virtual community 
P2P networks have millions of users. For example, BitTorrent, which is the most widely used file 
sharing network on the Internet, has 150 million users as of January 2012 (according to 
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BitTorrent.inc). Gnutella, which was the first decentralized P2P network, had a user base of millions in 
2010 and eDonkey had three million nodes measured in 2005.  
Cooperation in the virtual community 
Peer-to-peer file sharing networks are systems where individuals share digital files such as 
music, movies, software and images. In a peer-to-peer network, tasks (such as searching for files or 
streaming audio/video) are shared amongst multiple interconnected peers who each make a portion of 
their resources (such as processing power, disk storage or network bandwidth) directly available to 
other network participants, without the need for centralized coordination by servers. P2P networks 
reach their full potential only when large numbers of nodes contribute resources. But in current 
practice P2P networks often contain large numbers of users who utilize resources shared by other 
nodes, but who do not share anything themselves (often referred to as the "freeloader problem"). 
Freeloading can have a profound impact on the network and in some cases can cause the community 
to collapse. According to various studies on P2P networks researchers found that only 30% of users 
share files in Gnutella and the files they share are not necessarily the most desirable ones. Another 
study on KaZaA showed that people who shared files were only 9% of total users. 
Experiment method 
The experiment that was conducted in this study though, was not made in a real P2P network. 
The experiment situation was designed to approximate a simplified version of a real world system of 
digital information exchange, like those found on the internet. The experiment took place in the 
Department of Sociology at Stanford University. A total of 179 students participated in the experiment, 
which consisted of 10 rounds in which participants had to decide whether or not to contribute digital 
information goods to a collective information pool. Participants did not know in advance how many 
rounds there would be. In the beginning of the experiment participants were asked to give a list of 
their 20 favorite songs, movies or books and were told that they would use these items in a series of 
internet exchanges. Each item had a value of 10 points. In each round they had to decide whether to 
contribute one item or not. When contributing one item, all participants would gain 10 points except 
from the contributor. Moreover, the contributor would pay a small transfer cost of 5 points. So, the 
only way for someone to gain points was if other individuals contributed. 
Incentives and/or social mechanisms present 
The incentives studied were social approval and observational cooperation. As discussed in 
Section 4.74.7, social approval is the ability to have one’s contributions evaluated by others in the 
community and/or evaluate the contributions of others. The social approval condition was realized by 
allowing the participants who contributed in the previous round to vote for up to five items from the 
list of information goods as “the best items”. After the voting ended, each participant saw a bar chart 
on the screen that displayed his popularity rating from the previous round if he had contributed. If the 
participant had not contributed in this round, then he saw a message saying “no current contribution”. 
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In the high social approval condition, participants’ contribution rate is 75-95% and in the low 
condition, participation rate falls at 5-25%.  
The observational cooperation condition was manipulated similarly to the social approval 
condition. A bar chart was used to display the amount of observational cooperation in each round. In 
the high condition the individual saw that 75-95% of users contributed in the previous round and in 
the low condition the individual saw a percentage of 5-25% of contribution. The difference with the 
social approval condition was that, in this case, participants would see the observational cooperation 
bar chart whether they had contributed in the previous round or not.  
Results 
Studying the results of this experiment led to interesting conclusions. Regarding social approval, 
the experiment showed that both high and low social approval positively influence contribution. Even 
when social approval is low, participants – especially in the early stages – want to contribute to the 
system. This was an unexpected and exiting finding in this study. The kind of social approval used in 
this study was different than public reputation which may motivate contribution behavior for different 
reasons. In this study, social approval was restricted to the individual, which meant that no one else 
knew anyone else’s popularity rating. The popularity ratings that produced feelings of social approval 
were only known to the individual who made a contribution, whereas in other types of social approval, 
there may be a social desirability component like a public reputation. This implies that individuals 
really care about how their contribution (and perhaps by association, their own selves) is evaluated by 
the network, thus making social approval a powerful motivator for cooperation. 
Regarding observational cooperation, the experiment demonstrated that simply observing high 
amounts of cooperative behavior had a positive effect in contribution especially in the initial stages. On 
the other hand, observing low amounts of cooperation did not have a negative influence in 
contribution. This means that the ability to observe the amount of cooperation may be useful for 
fostering cooperation in real P2P systems, though the effects are likely short lived. So, normative 
compliance in the sense of reciprocity did not have a very strong impact on cooperation, as expected, 
although it was not clear how much cooperation would be affected if participants did not have any 
information about the behavior of others in the network.  
Based on the findings of the experiment, Chesire suggested that cooperation in generalized 
information systems like P2P networks can be encouraged if popularity ratings or other social 
approval techniques are used.  
5.2 The Effects of Feedback on Internet Information Pools  
Chesire and Antin in [[10]] examined cooperative behavior in information pools that produce a 
public good and argued that extremely low costs of contribution, combined with very large networks, 
facilitate the production of online information pools, despite the plethora of free-riders. They 
demonstrated that feedback incentives, like gratitude, historical reminders or relative ranking 
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influence contributions in such online systems. Apart from that, they showed that feedback has 
different effects according to the context in which people interact. Chesire and Antin made a 
dichotomous division between internal and external websites, where the first one is directly associated 
with the information pool and the latter is unrelated to the information pool, but provides 
opportunities for someone to contribute. 
Environment/Type of virtual community 
The environment where the experiment was conducted was a custom-built internet system 
called Mycroft. Mycroft is a web-based network, which allows large tasks to be widely distributed and 
the results efficiently collected so that thousands of individual contributors can work on the same 
project at the same time. Mycroft accepts large jobs which cannot technically or efficiently be 
completed by computers and breaks them down into many constituent parts called ‘puzzles.’ The 
puzzles are distributed via banner ads on existing websites, in place of traditional advertising 
materials. As each puzzle is answered, the results are combined with others at successively larger levels 
until the top-level job is complete. These banners exist on a primary website and on many diverse 
websites.  
 
Figure 7: The Mycroft banner interface 
 
Number of users that participate in the virtual community 
Thousands of people viewed the Mycroft banners more than 100,000 times between March 
2006 and October 2006. The banners were hosted on more than 20 websites, which were named 
“external” websites and an “internal” home website hosted the banners. For the test period of the 
study, there was a sample of 791 individuals who contributed at least once to the system (467 internal 
contributors and 324 external contributors). 
Cooperation in the virtual community 
People in this system had the opportunity to contribute in the system in a very simple and 
without cost way. During the experiment period Mycroft distributed puzzles that asked individuals to 
type in small portions of a text. After that, contributors would receive (or not) a type of feedback.  
Experiment method 
All users who saw the Mycroft banners, either in an external website or in Mycroft home 
website, had the potential to contribute. Since this experiment was meant to examine retention 
incentives, there were no incentives provided for someone to contribute for the first time. Individuals 
who made at least one contribution were placed in one of the four feedback conditions (gratitude, 
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historical reminder, relative ranking and no-feedback). In the first three groups people constantly 
received the relevant feedback type, whereas in the control group contributors did not receive any 
feedback. 
In order to measure retention researchers used the repeat contribution rate (RCR), which is the 
average number of contributions that a given individual makes over all contribution sessions. Since 
there was the case for one user to have multiple sessions, Mycroft used “cookies” in order to uniquely 
identify those who contributed to Mycroft through multiple sessions. 
 
Figure 8: Examples of three types of feedback 
 
Incentives and/or social mechanisms present 
The gratitude feedback had the form of a simple static “Thank you” message, which was 
presented to the contributor immediately after a contribution and it was the same every time. The 
historical reminder feedback presented a simple count of the number of times an individual had 
contributed (e.g., ‘You have contributed 12 times’). The number was dynamic, counting upwards each 
time a contribution was made. Finally, the relative ranking feedback was a percentage ranking of one’s 
contributions compared to all other current contributors. For example, a first-time contributor might 
see that he was in the top 99% percent of all contributors, whereas a frequent contributor might find 
himself in the top 5 or 10 percent of all contributors. 
Apart from the feedback type researchers examined the context of interaction, which was the 
internal or external website. All four feedback conditions were examined in both contexts (internal and 
external), thus resulting in a total of eight conditions. 
Results 
The experiment showed that when people in the external websites received feedback of any 
type, contributions increased compared to the users who did not receive any feedback. On the 
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contrary, feedback did not have the same effect in the internal sites. More precisely, only the relative 
ranking type increased contributions in the internal sites. Another result of the experiment was that if 
people in the internal or the external websites all received the same feedback, contributors who 
interacted through the internal website had higher repeat contributions compared to those who 
contributed through external websites. 
The case of external websites, where a banner exists in an unrelated website, is representative of 
much real world activity on the internet where various forms of content are displayed in or around the 
periphery of unrelated websites. Thus, these results may apply to similar situations in which 
individuals contribute via small areas of larger websites. 
The interesting finding of this study was that the context in which people interact has an 
important influence in the effectiveness of some types of feedback. Internal users did not increase 
contributions with all types of feedback. This can be explained by the fact that people who interact 
through the home website consider their task as a primary activity, whereas people in the external 
websites do this as a secondary activity. In the first case people have strong collective identity, which 
promotes feelings of reciprocity and obligation and by applying extrinsic motives like feedback we 
get the opposite effect. This is another example of the crowding effect, where extrinsic motivation can 
undermine intrinsic incentives. 
5.3 Understanding the Motives for Contribution in Open Source Software 
Roberts et al. in [[44]] made an extensive research in the area of Open Source Software (OSS) to 
investigate the incentives that motivate software developers to contribute to Apache projects. In 
previous studies several motivations had been revealed, but there was no consensus to which 
motivation is most dominant. Roberts et al. investigated how the different motivations of OSS 
developers are interrelated (i.e., independent, complementary of contradictory), how these 
motivations influence participation leading to performance, and how past performance influences 
subsequent motivations. 
Environment/Type of virtual community 
The research was focused on the three major OSS projects under the control of the Apache 
Software Foundation (ASF). The ASF includes a number of subprojects related to the development of a 
full-featured Web server product. These were the Apache web server project, the Jakarta project and 
the XML project. The Apache Web Server is a freely available source code implementation of a 
hypertext transfer protocol (http) server and is the project around which the Apache Group initially 
formed. The Jakarta project consists of 19 Apache-related Java subprojects and the XML project 
consists of 16 Apache-related XML subprojects. 
Number of users that participate in the virtual community 
Hundreds of people have made contributions to the Apache project so far. For the purpose of 
this research 1,301 uniquely identified contributors were invited via email by the chairman of ASF to 
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participate in the survey. 18% of the emails were undelivered and from the remaining ones, 325 
contributors accepted to participate in the research. Because of some missing pieces of information, a 
few responses were dropped, resulting in a usable sample of 288 responses.  
Cooperation in the virtual community 
Apache projects are based on the contributions of high motivated developers, who are often self-
employed freelancers and volunteers. The Apache projects were not originally organized around a 
single person or primary contributor. The projects are organized using a meritocracy and the motto is 
“The more work you have done, the more you are allowed to do”. There are several levels of 
recognition within ASF; developer, committer, project management committee member and ASF 
member. A developer contributes by submitting a “patch” to the project, which is analogue to 
modification requests in traditional software development environments.  
When a developer contributes to an Apache project, his commitment is recognized by advancing 
in the ASF hierarchy. Promotion to a higher rank is awarded after one or more cycles of contribution 
followed by a positive peer review. Although the number of attainable ranks is limited, the number of 
promotion opportunities at any rank is not constrained. For example, there is no limit to the number 
of contributors who can achieve the rank of developer or to the number of developers who can be 
promoted to the rank of committer. 
Experiment method 
Researchers developed a theoretical model that included measures of motivation, participation 
and performance. They evaluated this model by using archival data regarding contributions in the 
Apache projects and also by conducting a survey addressed to existing Apache contributors. 
The archival data was collected from OSS records, which included all contributions from 1999 to 
2002. Apache products include developer websites, change logs, documentation, and developer 
communications in the form of e-mail archives. From these products, the data extracted were each 
contributor’s progression along the Apache career path, and each contributor’s source code 
contributions to the project. 
The survey conducted was a secure web based survey of Apache contributors, who responded 
what motivated them to contribute. The number of accepted responses was from 288 contributors. 
In order to quantify variables for the theoretical model, researchers defined the following 
measures. Some of them were measured by the participants’ answers through the survey and others 
were calculated through the archived data collection. 
1. EXTRINSIC (monetary): The average number of hours per week for which respondents were 
paid for their work. 
2. USE VALUE (How important it is to solve bugs or problems or add needed features): Two-
scale items answer. 
3. STATUS (How important status is): Four-scale items answer. 
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4. INTRINSIC (The task itself is enjoyable): Four-scale items answer. 
5. PARTICIPATION2: Several measures were derived. 
a. The cumulative number of patches submitted and accepted. 
b. The cumulative number of lines of code submitted and accepted for a year. 
c. Convert each contribution to a common function point metric using industry standard 
language conversion factors and use this as a metric. 
6. PERFORMANCE: The number of changes in the ASF rank hierarchy. 
7. EDUCATION: A respondent’s years of education. 
8. EXPERIENCE: A respondent’s years of work experience. 
 
Incentives and/or social mechanisms present 
The incentives examined in this research fall into three categories of incentives: intrinsic, 
extrinsic and internalized extrinsic motives.  
The intrinsic motive to contribute work to OSS is the enjoyment of the task itself. Software 
development is an inherently motivating task, because it is complicated and creative. Software 
development in OSS, compared to that in a company, offers developers greater opportunities to 
express their creativity, enjoy their work and experience a sense of satisfaction and accomplishment.  
The extrinsic motive investigated in the survey was monetary. Although OSS communities do 
not have a profit motive and hence do not offer monetary compensation to contributors, there are 
third parties who employ programmers to contribute to specific parts of OSS projects. An example is 
IBM's involvement in Apache OSS projects.  
Regarding internalized extrinsic motives, there were two motives examined. The first one is 
related to status and career opportunities. OSS communities offer an ideal setting in which a 
participant motivated by career concerns can signal his abilities to the labor market. Status is also an 
important motivator, when one tries to increase his standing in a reference group. The next 
internalized motive was “use value”, which could be the desire to fix a bug or solve a problem with is 
related to the contributor.  
Results 
The evaluation of the model revealed several results. The first one was that contributors have 
multiple motivations to contribute and that some of them are complementary whereas others are not.  
                                                             
2  Although OSS volunteers provide many different kinds of services to Apache projects, the principal 
participation behavior is authoring and maintaining the software. Thus, this kind of participation was 
measured by Roberts' et al. research. 
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Regarding how monetary incentives are related to the other types of incentives, the results 
showed that a) monetary incentives did not crowd out intrinsic motivations; being paid to contribute 
was positively related to participants’ status to contribute and b) monetary incentives were negatively 
related to use-value motivations.   
Findings about intrinsic motives were contrary to researchers’ predictions. No significant 
relationship was found between intrinsic motives and participations levels. One explanation of this 
could be that OSS contributors are self-directed and it is possible that their intrinsic incentives were 
not fully aligned to the mission of the OSS community. For example, a potential contributor may be 
intrinsically motivated to work on perfecting one feature of the code that performs a relatively minor 
function, and may spend inordinate amounts of time perfecting the single feature rather than 
implementing a large number of contributions. 
Contributors who declared use-value incentives were not found to have high contributions. This 
can be explained because developers motivated by use-value want to solve a particular bug that is 
causing them trouble or to add a particular feature that they need to use. Once they have solved the 
immediate problem or added the particular feature they may lose interest in making future 
contributions if there are no further salient problems or issues to motivate them. This means that 
these users will need different types of incentives in order to sustain their level of participation.  
Another finding was that the Apache meritocracy is operating effectively, and that promotions 
within the community are indeed based on actual contributions to the Apache projects. This is 
important for a community like Apache that depends on shared leadership and the contributions of 
participants for its success. 
Finally, status motivation was positively related to contributions. When a contributor 
motivated by status climbed in AFS hierarchy, his status motivation to participate increased.  
According to the above findings, Roberts’ et al. made some suggestions that could be useful for 
encouraging contributions in OSS communities. First, OSS communities should largely welcome 
commercial efforts by companies. Second, since developers with higher status motivations were the 
most substantive contributors, OSS systems could perhaps devote distinct website space to recognize 
distinguished developers or promote OSS development as a way to enter the labor market. Third, 
OSS communities should use a more effective feedback system that stresses the competence of the 
contributor and that provides detailed information and feedback on performance. The current 
feedback system, which is an announcement of a rank increase, failed to enhance intrinsic 
motivations, whereas feedback that indicates personal competence could increase intrinsic 
motivation. 
5.4 Social Desirability Bias and Self-Reports of Motivation in Amazon Mturk 
Antin and Shaw in [[5]] examined how social desirability bias affects self-reports of motivation 
in a crowd sourcing service such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Many studies on motivation 
D2: Collective Awareness Platforms: Privacy, incentives and market dimensions 
 
08 May 2015 FP7-288021 – ©The EINS Consortium Page 51 of 68 
 
rely on survey based techniques where participants explicitly state their motivations. This kind of 
response however is vulnerable to social desirability bias or the tendency to respond in ways that 
participants believe would appear desirable to others. By using “list experiment”, a survey technique 
that mitigates social desirability bias, Antin and Shaw proved that this motivation was indeed present 
among workers in MTurk. 
Environment/Type of virtual community 
Mturk is a crowd sourcing system, which is part online community and online labor market. In 
this platform “requesters”, who can be individuals or businesses, co-ordinate the use of human 
intelligence to perform tasks that computers are currently unable to do. This is done by distributing 
small chunks of work to thousands of workers around the world. These chunks of work are called 
Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) and the people who undertake them, called the “workers”, spend a 
few minutes or seconds to answer them and earn small payments, which typically range from a few 
cents to a few dollars.  
Number of users that participate in the virtual community 
The population of Amazon Mechanical Turk workers has altered over the years after it launched 
publicly in 2005. In 2007, there were reportedly more than 100,000 workers in over 100 countries, 
whereas in 2010, as reported by Amazon, there were 200,000 workers and about 50,000-100,000 
HITs to work on at any given time. This workers population is spread around the world, but several 
studies regarding MTurk have revealed that the vast majority of visits come from USA and India, with 
percentage 46.8% and 34% respectively. 
Cooperation in the virtual community 
Participants in MTurk are of two types, requesters and workers. The first group designs HITs by 
using different templates according to the HIT type and then these HITs are available for workers to 
pick up. Some HIT types are podcast transcribing, rating, image tagging, writing or rewriting 
sentences, writing paragraphs or whole articles. Other kinds of HITs are linking to or commenting on a 
blog and “friending” a person on Facebook. 
Workers complete HITs by looking through the large database of HITs that are available 
through Mechanical Turk. Some HITs, however, require qualifications, which workers earn through 
either taking a qualification test or by acquiring certain benchmarks such as completing a certain 
number of HITs or having an approval rate above a certain percentage. According to their 
performance, some workers can be characterized as Masters and have access to higher levels of work. 
Each worker can monitor his/her performance and earnings through their account in Mturk. 
Experiment method 
The method used in the experiment was the “List experiment”, which is a type of indirect 
questioning. The list experiment asks each participant to report only how many he selects from a list of 
possible choices. If the participant does not answer thoughtlessly, then the list experiment provides an 
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opportunity for the respondent to express support for his “true” attitudes without explicitly naming 
them. 
Having in mind that most workers come from two main populations, Antin and Shaw examined 
two different groups in the following experiment. One India-Based group with 1216 Turkers and one 
US-Based group with 1200 Turkers.  
To assess motivations for doing HITs on MTurk, participants were asked survey questions using 
traditional agreement statements and the list experiment. First, randomly selected participants were 
asked to make a binary choice to agree or disagree with four motivation statements. These motivation 
statements were based on previous survey research on MTurk and were the following: “I am motivated 
to do HITs on Mechanical Turk…” (1) “to kill time”, (2) “to make extra money”, (3) “for fun” and (4) 
“because it gives me a sense of purpose”. Participants were randomly assigned to one of five groups. In 
the control group participants were shown a list of all 4 motivations, whereas in the other 4 groups 
participants were shown only 3 out of 4 motivations – each of four motivations was absent in one 
group. By using this technique, even though participants did not explicitly say which motivation they 
preferred, the difference in means between each treatment group and the control group can be 
considered as the item preferred by the participant.  
Incentives and/or social mechanisms present 
The basic incentive examined in this study was social desirability bias, which is the tendency of 
people to respond in ways that perceive as socially desirable by others. This incentive is possible to 
exist in survey self-reports of motivation for two reasons. First, there are often socially desirable 
connections between motivations and activities. Secondly, one’s motivation is often interpreted as a 
signal of other characteristics.  
The questions raised in this experiment were a) whether survey self-reports of motivation are 
subject to social desirability bias and b) whether there is evidence of similar or distinct profiles of 
social desirability effects across Mturk’s two primary sub-populations. 
A secondary incentive that was not exactly examined in this study, but for which certain 
conclusions were drawn, were monetary incentives. MTurk offers small amount of money for each 
HIT, so this is a motive that a few collective intelligence systems have. 
Results 
The results of agreement statement survey were compared to the list experiment for each MTurk 
sub group. There were numerous differences in the motivations expressed by the different method and 
the different groups, meaning that social desirability bias did affect participants’ responses. For 
example, within the US sample, agreement statements modestly over-reported three of the four 
motivations compared to the list experiment: “killing time” (36% over-reported), “fun” (32% over-
reported), and “sense of purpose” (33% over-reported). Over-reporting was more intense in the case of 
“money” as a motivation (40% over-reported). This means that social desirability appears to 
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encourage individuals in the US group to say that money is a motivator even though that may not be 
the case. 
In the Indian population social desirability effects were also evident and even greater and more 
diverse than in the US population. Agreement statements under-reported 2 motivations, “killing time” 
(–142%) and “fun” (–62%), and dramatically over-reported “sense of purpose” by almost 200% 
compared to the list experiment. Results showed no social desirability bias was related to money as a 
motivator. So, in the case of Turkers in India, social desirability appears to encourage individuals to 
over-state the importance of “sense of purpose” as a motivator, and under-state the importance of 
both “killing time” and “fun”. 
Although social desirability did not alter the rank-order of motivations between the agreement-
statement and the list experiment conditions, the findings are important. So, regarding the two 
questions raised by the researchers, the answer is: a) reports of online motivation can be subject to 
social desirability bias and b) the cross-national comparison indicates that the precise contours of 
social desirability depend on the context of interaction, the task at hand, and the populations involved.  
The general lack of social presence in the MTurk user interface makes it a conservative test for 
social desirability bias effects in online collaborative settings. Social desirability bias is magnified by 
the actual or perceived presence of others when answering questions. In the context of MTurk, 
however, there are few user-to-user interactions or signs of social presence. This reduced social 
presence in a compute mediated context should make social desirability effects less likely. Since it was 
proven by this experiment, that social desirability effects exist among MTurk workers, then this 
increases evidence that social desirability bias is present in other contexts with greater social presence. 
This research added further evidence that monetary incentives represent just one part of a 
complex motivational array behind paid work. Incentive systems that rely solely on paying users for 
content, ignoring other key motivations such as fun and providing a sense of purpose have the risk to 
fail. Likewise, collaborative systems that seek to engage workers or collaborators from diverse 
backgrounds may benefit from context-specific adaptations to sub-populations with divergent 
attitudes about money or employment.  
5.5 Energy Saving through Social Comparison 
Sustainable HCI research has focused on changing individuals’ behavior in order to help address 
large-scale societal concerns such as climate change. Sustainable HCI research draws from theories 
and concepts from psychology and behavioral economics and integrates them into IT technology 
aiming to motivate people to adopt environmentally friendly behavior. Petkov et al. in [[39]] 
investigated how social comparison and feedback can motivate users to conserve energy, through the 
mobile application EnergyWiz. 
Environment/Type of virtual community 
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The platform used was a mobile application called EnergyWiz, which was designed and 
developed for this experiment. Users were able to see live data of their energy consumption, their 
consumption history and also a comparison with neighbors who also participated in the program. 
 
Figure 9: EnergyWiz - Main menu (left), Neighbors (right) 
 
Number of users that participate in the virtual community 
The number of users that participated in the program was 17 users, most of them between 25 
and 34 years old – 14 were full-time employees and the rest of them were students. 
Cooperation in the virtual community 
The EnergyWiz application contained five main features which correlated with different types of 
comparative feedback. These main features included 1) Live Data, 2) History, 3) Neighbors, 4) 
Challenge, and 5) Ranking. The application relied on direct, real-time consumption data from the 
household, and the game was designed so users could switch between different units (kWh, cost, and 
CO2). Users could share their current energy consumption on Facebook, as well as challenge their 
friends to an energy saving competition. 
Experiment method 
The first step was to design and develop the EnergyWiz application. Then researchers organized 
personal interviews with the 17 prospective EnergyWiz users.  The interview process was two-fold: 
First researchers examined each application and gave the participant meaningful tasks in the form of 
scenarios. During the experiment period, EnergyWiz was filled with real data. At the end of the 
experiment period, users were interviewed again and shared what motivated them to compare with 
others and their experience in energy conservation at home. 
Incentives and/or social mechanisms present 
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Research used feedback in order to monitor and evaluate behavior combined with different 
types of social comparison. The three types of social comparative feedback used were normative, one-
to-one and ranking. 
In normative comparison an individual or a group is compared to the average performance of 
the group. In EnergyWiz this was implemented by the “Neighbors” feature, where a user could 
compare his energy consumption with the average performance of two groups of neighbors - efficient 
and inefficient (Figure 9 right). 
One-to-one comparison involves only two persons who compare between themselves. This was 
realized in EnergyWiz by a challenge between two friends in Facebook who compared their energy 
consumption during a week (Figure 10 left). 
Finally ranking was realized by showing an ordered list of EnergyWiz users with similar 
attributes, like household size and residence type (Figure 10 right). 
 
Figure 10: EnergyWiz – Challenge (left), Ranking (right) 
 
Results 
Results showed that normative comparison (realized as the “Neighbors” feature) was partially 
supported as a motive for conserving energy.  This was because users were not convinced that the 
people they were compared to had similar characteristics with them. One-to-one comparison 
(“Challenge”) did not receive much support, because most friends are dissimilar concerning their 
energy consumption. The ranking feature was partly suitable, but interviewees were concerned about 
the difference experience levels among the ranked users.  
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The results of this study were restricted because of the small number of users who participated, 
but also because the study group was homogenous. Researchers planned to expand the experiment to 
more households with greater diversity in order to reach more accurate findings. 
5.6 Badges in Social Media 
Gamification is a rather new concept which applies game mechanics and game design 
techniques to make products and services more fun and engaging. Some of these techniques have been 
integrated also in virtual communities. Antin and Churchill in [[4]] presented how badges can be used 
in social media, by giving some examples of social systems such as Foursquare, StackOverflow and 
Wikipedia that use badges in order to motivate users. 
Environment/Type of virtual community 
Foursquare [[20]] is a location-based social networking website for mobile devices, such as 
smartphones. Users “check in” at venues using a mobile website, text messaging or a device-specific 
application by selecting from a list of venues the application locates nearby. Location is based on GPS 
hardware in the mobile device or network location provided by the application. Foursquare has clients 
for smartphones such as iPhone, BlackBerry, Palm and the Android platform. Thus, Foursquare lets 
users “check in” to a place, when they are there, tell friends where they are and track the history of 
where they’ve been and who they’ve been there with.  
StackOverflow [[51]] is a question and answer (Q&A) site on a wide range of topics in computer 
programming. StackOverflow serves as a platform for users to ask and answer questions. Participants 
who become members can ask questions regarding programming issues they have faced, vote for 
questions and answers raised by others, edit questions and answers and also give answers. 
StackOverflow members can earn reputation points and badges.  
Wikipedia [[55]] is a collaboratively edited, multilingual, free Internet encyclopedia that is 
supported by the non-profit Wikimedia Foundation. Volunteers worldwide collaboratively write 
Wikipedia's 30 million articles in 287 languages, including over 4.5 million in the English Wikipedia. 
Anyone who can access the site can edit almost any of its articles, which on the Internet comprise the 
largest and most popular general reference work.  
Number of users that participate in the virtual community 
Foursquare community is formed by 50 million people worldwide, who make millions of check-
ins every day. Stackoverflow has over 2.7 million registered users who have raised more than 7 millions 
questions.  
Wikipedia users are of two types, the “Wikipedians”, who contribute to the site and the 
“Readers”, who simply read articles. Wikipedia has more than 21 millions of named accounts with 
different user rights. The people who contribute regularly are a minority of these account holders. 
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Apart from registered users, there is a relatively large number of unregistered Wikipedians who also 
contribute to the site. 
Cooperation in the virtual community 
When people participate in Foursquare by checking in, they gain virtual rewards. These rewards 
come in the forms of points, badges, and mayorships visible in one’s public profile. Badges are 
awarded for a variety of reasons, e.g., for starting to use the service, checking-in on a boat, checking in 
with 50 people at the same time, or checking-in at a special event. Mayorships are awarded to a single 
individual for having the most check-ins in a given place in the past 60 days, where only one check-in 
per day is counted. 
Since Stackoverflow members have the ability to vote answers and questions, good answers are 
voted up and rise to the top. One’s reputation goes up, when others vote up his questions, answers and 
edits. As this reputation increases, this person has also the ability to vote, comment and even edit 
other people’s posts. Apart from reputation, StackOverflow members earn badges, which are special 
achievements for participating. There are badges for Questions, Answers, Participation or other 
actions and they all come up in three levels: bronze, silver and gold. For example, a bronze medal for 
an answer is given if this answer has score of 10 or more. A gold medal for a question is awarded to 
someone who asked a question with 10,000 views.  
In Wikipedia everyone can edit an article without permission, even without making an account. 
In different language editions these rules may slightly differ, for example only a registered user can 
create an article in the English edition. But in general, an article becomes immediately available for 
editing right after it has been published. No article is considered to be owned by its creator or any 
other editor, nor is it vetted by any recognized authority. Instead, editors are supposed to agree on the 
content and structure of articles by consensus. Each article has a “History” page, so editors can use this 
page to restore lost content or undo changes. There are also “Talk” pages, which are associated to a 
specific article or associated to particular contributors. These “Talk” pages are used for coordinating 
work among multiple editors and also as a tool for reaching consensus for an article.  
Contributors on Wikipedia are awarded with “barnstars” [[54]]. Everyone can award a barnstar 
to someone, as long as he provides relevant text as to why he is awarding it. There are different kinds 
of barnstars, like the “Barnstar of Diligence”, which is awarded to someone who shows a combination 
of extraordinary scrutiny, precision and community service, the “Citation Barnstar” which is for users 
who provide references to unsourced articles, the “Working Wikipedian's Barnstar”, which is for users 
who work tirelessly and endlessly on the more laborious or repetitive of Wikipedia tasks, and many 
more. These barnstars have been added to Wikipedia by the users themselves, after discussing it in a 
relevant “Talk” page. 
Incentives and/or social mechanisms present 
Badges are considered as virtual goods in online social media, which are awarded to users who 
complete specific activities. Antin and Churchill in [[4]] argued that although badges are valuable and 
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useful, they do not inherently produce social engagement or enhance motivation. Badges serve several 
individual and social functions that depend on the nature of the activity. Thus, Antin and Churchill 
presented five primary functions for achievements that exist in badges. 
The first function and most obvious one is goal setting, which is known to be an effective 
motivator. Goals presented in a badge are not always explicit, either because system designers choose 
only to outline how to earn a badge or because the necessary activities are subjective.  Another 
important aspect of goal setting is when users can see their progress towards a goal.  
The second function for achievements is instruction. Badges provide instruction about what 
types of achievements are possible in a given system. This function is useful, because it teaches new 
users into the system. Instruction provides social shaping of user activities and badges can benefit the 
system even if users never actually earn the badges. 
The next function examined is reputation. Badges provide information on the basis of which 
reputation assessments can be made. They encapsulate user’s interests, expertise and past experience. 
When someone examines another user’s badges, he can shape an opinion of the user’s interests and 
engagement levels. By providing an encapsulated assessment of engagement, experience and expertise, 
badges are a valuable tool that increases trustworthiness of other people and reliability of content. 
Status and affirmation are the next functions of achievement. Badges can be motivating as 
status symbols. The power of status rewards derives from the expectation that others will look more 
favorably upon someone who has earned a badge. Also badges provide personal affirmation in that 
they serve as reminders of past achievements.  
The last function for achievement is group identification. Badges communicate a set of shared 
activities that bind a group of users together around shared experience. Achieving badges can provide 
a sense of solidarity and increase positive group identification through the perception of similarity 
between an individual and the group. This type of group identification is valuable in social media 
because increased group identification promotes increased cooperation in collaborative situations. 
Results 
Studying the use of badges provided ample evidence that badges are an important motivator for 
collaboration in social systems. This does not mean that all badges favor contribution. For example in 
Foursquare, only some types of badges are considered as useful my most users. Furthermore, since 
badges are extrinsic motives, the extensive use of badges may undermine intrinsic motivation, leading 
to the conclusion that they should be carefully designed. 
5.7 Similarity vs. uniqueness in MovieLens 
Research on this paper focused on two conditions that can positively influence people’s 
participation in online communities. The researchers carried out a field experiment in the MovieLens 
film recommender system and manipulated two factors that according to social theory would influence 
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participation in a group: similarity of group members and uniqueness of a member’s qualification for a 
group task [[31]].  
Environment/Type of virtual community 
The virtual community in which the study was made is MovieLens.org, an online community for 
film recommendation, administered by the University of Minnesota. MovieLens collects users’ 
opinions about movies in order to generate personalized recommendations for other movies. 
MovieLens uses a technology called collaborative filtering to generate movie recommendations. It 
works by matching together users with similar opinions about movies. Each member of the system has 
a 'neighborhood' of other like-minded users. Ratings from these neighbors are used to create 
personalized recommendations for the target user. 
Number of users that participate in the virtual community 
MovieLens has over 70,000 registered users. In the time period when the study was made, the 
number of active users was over 2,000 in a given month. Thus, a large potential user base was 
available for the experiment. 
Cooperation in the virtual community 
Members of MovieLens contribute to the community by rating movies and writing movie 
reviews. When there are a lot ratings for a movie, then the recommender algorithms can make more 
accurate predictions about whether subscribers will like this movie or not.  
Experiment method 
The researchers expanded MovieLen’s functionality by adding new online discussion groups 
with controlled design parameters in order to study how contribution in the community is affected by 
uniqueness and group similarity. People who participated in the experiment were MovieLens users 
that had rated at least 50 movies in the past. The total number of the experiment participants was 245 
users. 
The participants formed different groups, e.g., some groups consisted of members with similar 
ratings (similar groups), some groups consisted of members with less similar ratings (dissimilar 
groups) and some other groups received weekly emails advising them of a unique perspective they 
could bring to the current discussion topic (groups with uniqueness condition). The different groups 
participated in a different forum that they were assigned to. The experiment lasted 5 weeks and the 
research team posted a discussion topic every week.  
Finding the participants’ characteristics that are similar or not in order to group them into 
different groups, was done by mining MovieLens data to find how subjects’ movie ratings differed from 
others in the group.  
Incentives and/or social mechanisms present 
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The first parameter tested was uniqueness of a member’s qualification for a group task. People 
in the uniqueness condition received a weekly message telling them how their MovieLens ratings 
differed from others in their group relative to a discussion topic. The person in the “unique” group was 
informed that a movie he/she had previously rated was a rather rare one, in the sense that few others 
had only rated it, thus implying that this person had unique information and that he/she could 
probably contribute to the discussion group. 
The other parameter tested was similarity of the group members. “Similarity” for two users 
means they tend to see the same movies and agree on their evaluations of the movies. “Dissimilar” 
users either see different movies or disagree on whether they like movies they have both seen. 
Results 
The results of the experiment showed that both factors influence participation in the virtual 
community. The key finding was that dissimilar groups who were given uniqueness information were 
the most active communities throughout the experiment.  
Regarding the uniqueness condition, community members liked receiving information about 
the unique perspective they brought to the group and participated more because of it. One interesting 
result regarding the similarity condition was that participants from similar groups contributed less 
than those in dissimilar groups. This result was unexpected, because social theory suggests that 
people are attracted to others similar to themselves. As discussed earlier in previous sections4.3, a 
social group is a set of people who view themselves as members of the same social category, in which 
they share common attitudes, beliefs, values, affective reactions, behavioral norms, etc.. As a result of 
this, it was expected that people with similar characteristics would contribute more. Practice showed a 
different behavior, where people with dissimilar views had longer exchanges, appearing to banter back 
and forth defending their positions. This agrees with social loafing theory (Ref. Section 4.44.4), where 
people working together put less effort that if they were alone. In the case of MovieLens, it looks like 
people in similar groups were not motivated enough to contribute, because they expected that others 
“similar” to them would contribute.  
This study concluded that both uniqueness and similarity affect participation in a virtual 
community and if combined so that dissimilar groups are formed and given information about the 
uniqueness perspective, then participation in the community can be increased. Based on the findings 
of the experiment, researchers proposed two guidelines to encourage participation: “tell people how 
they are special with respect to the community and its purpose” and “create dissimilar groups in 
situations where disagreement can be tolerated”. 
5.8 Uniqueness, Benefit and Goal Setting in Online Communities 
MovieLens was chosen also by Ling et al. in [[28]] as a platform for testing the motives that 
influence contributions in online communities. Apart from uniqueness, that was also examined in the 
previous research, the incentives examined were benefit and goal setting. Researchers carried out two 
D2: Collective Awareness Platforms: Privacy, incentives and market dimensions 
 
08 May 2015 FP7-288021 – ©The EINS Consortium Page 61 of 68 
 
studies on MovieLens, where uniqueness and benefit to self and others was tested in the first study and 
individual or group goal setting was tested in the second study. 
MovieLens predictions are based on recommender algorithms that work better when there are a 
lot of ratings for each movie. More than 20% of the movies listed in the system have so few ratings that 
the recommender algorithms cannot make accurate predictions about whether subscribers will like a 
movie or not. Since this research investigated the uniqueness incentive, it focused on rarely-rated 
movies. 
Experiment method 
The subjects selected for the experiment were active MovieLens members who had rated rare 
movies in the past. They received an email inviting them to participate in a movie rating campaign. 
Researchers identified the abstract mental state for each incentive examined and designed persuasive 
messages for each case. Then the subjects’ contribution behavior was tracked. The number of 
participants was 830 for the first study and 834 for the second.  
Incentives and/or social mechanisms present 
The research was based on and tried to confirm the Collective Effort Model (Ref. Section 
4.4.24.4.2), which supports that when people believe that their effort is identifiable and important to 
others, then people will contribute more. So the first incentive examined was uniqueness and subjects 
received an email reminding them about their unique contributions. 
The second incentive examined was benefit to self and others. Benefit to self means that raters 
personally gain benefit because predictions for them become more accurate. Benefit to others means 
that ratings help the whole MovieLens community, because accurate recommendations can be made 
for all members. Finally there can be benefit for both self and others by combining the two. Regarding 
the incentives presented in Chapter 4, benefit to self can be compared to monetary incentives (Section 
4.144.14) and benefit to others corresponds to altruism (Section 4.64.6). 
The third incentive examined was goal setting. Although MovieLens provides users with 
feedback information about the number of ratings they have made, it does not give an indication of the 
number of ratings they should make or which movies would be most helpful to rate. This was the first 
attempt to test whether goal-setting theory applies to contribution in an online community. For this 
purpose, some participants were told that they participated in a group of 10 people and some others 
had no information about belonging to a group, so these were the individual subjects. The goals were 
set in a specific way (e.g., specific number of ratings that should be completed) or in a generic way 
(e.g., participants do their best). The different cases of group vs. individual and specific vs. generic 
goals were examined. 
Results 
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As demonstrated as well by the previous sections, uniqueness proved in this paradigm to 
positively affect contribution. People who received a message that emphasized their uniqueness, made 
more ratings than others.  
Results about benefit were diverse and complex regarding benefit to self and benefit to others. 
Users who made more ratings were the ones who a) received no information about benefit or b) 
received information about benefit for both self and others compared to users who received 
information about benefit only for self or only for others. 
Results regarding goal setting showed that specific goals will motivate greater contributions 
than non-specific goals. On the other hand members assigned individual goals do not contribute 
more than members assigned group goals. 
The interesting findings of the two studies of this paper were, first that benefits negatively affect 
contribution. This is consistent with the crowding-out effect mentioned before, which states that 
external motives undermine intrinsic motivation.  
The other interesting finding was that participants contributed more when they were assigned 
group goals instead of individual ones. This finding was counter to researchers’ initial predictions, but 
Ling et al. used the notion of social facilitation to explain it. Social facilitation suggests that individuals 
who perceive that their contributions can be evaluated by others will be likely to increase their 
contributions toward the group task.  In the current study individuals knew that their efforts would be 
evaluated, because certain goals were set, so they would be evaluated whether they had reached their 
goals or not.  
5.9 Summary 
Table 4 summarizes the incentives and social mechanisms described in Chapter 5 that are 
present in the different types of virtual communities analyzed in this chapter. 
Table 4: Incentives present in different types of virtual communities 
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Social Loafing       X  
Social Facilitation        X 
Trust      X   
Altruism        X 
Social Approval X        
Reputation      X   
Social Desirability Bias    X     
Observational 
cooperation 
X        
Uniqueness       X X 
Reciprocity  X       
Goal Setting      X  X 
Feedback  X X  X    
Monetary Incentives   X X    X 
Gamification      X   
Task Enjoyment   X X     
Use Value   X      
Status   X   X   
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6 Conclusions 
In this deliverable, we investigate dimensions that motivate human behavior within virtual 
communities, with specific focus on identifying those types of mechanisms, with reasonable levels of 
segregation or even personalization, which engage humans into mechanisms of active contribution and 
sharing of knowledge. The reported research spans various existing virtual communities and highlights 
the difficulty of suggesting an one-fits-all success rule for the sustainability of the community. 
In a nutshell, effective mechanisms that potentially motivate contribution in virtual 
communities include setting goals, promoting and leveraging users' uniqueness, implementing 
monetary incentives, providing feedback and hosting modules for gamification. Setting personalized 
goals in a community is considered as a key motivator to increase contribution. Although similarity in 
a group constitutes a significant motive for participation, uniqueness appears as a more powerful 
mechanism. Informing people about their uniqueness with respect to the community and its purpose 
appears more inspiring. Regarding uniqueness, particular benefits emerge if dissimilar groups are 
created (by operators of virtual communities) in situations where disagreement can be tolerated. 
Monetary incentives should be carefully implemented since in several cases personal benefits 
undermine intrinsic motivations. When feedback is provided as an extrinsic incentive, it should 
account for the context of interaction (e.g., if users are highly motivated because of other incentives, 
such as loyalty or reciprocity, feedback is not encouraging). Gamification, which is based on people's 
interest for competition, achievement, status, self-expression, and altruism, could also trigger creative 
reactions. Overall, all different mechanisms reported in this deliverable should be properly 
implemented to achieve consistent and nominal user commitment to communities’ activities and thus, 
secure the sustainability of platforms/systems/applications. 
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Abbreviations - Acronyms 
ASF Apache Software Foundation 
CAPs Collective Awareness Platforms 
CCI Center for Collective Intelligence 
CI Collective Intelligence 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GPS Global Positioning System 
HCI Human-Computer Interaction 
HIT Human Intelligence Task 
ICT Information and Communication Technology 
IoT Internet of Things 
MPCR Marginal Per Capita Return 
NIMBY Not In My Backyard  
OSN Online Social Network 
OSS Open Source Software 
P2P Peer to Peer 
Q&A Questions &  Answers  
SIDE Social Identity Model of De-individuation Effects 
SNS Social Networking Site 
VC Virtual Community 
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